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The sovereign debt of emerging market economies as an asset class offers attractive 
opportunities to international investors seeking portfolio diversification. However, investors 
need to assess the level of default risk embedded in sovereign debt and the adequate price for 
such risk. 
For these purposes, this thesis develops an empirical framework composed of two 
models. In the first model, I assess the effect of several macroeconomic factors on the sovereign 
CDS spreads of a monthly panel of 19 emerging countries from January 2007 to July 2019. I 
estimate the model by a dynamic fixed effects regression. Sovereign CDS are credit derivative 
contracts based on the solvency of sovereign issuers, wherein the seller promises to make a 
contingent payment to the buyer if the sovereign reference entity fails to meet its obligations. 
They are often adopted as a proxy of the pricing of sovereign credit risk, as the spreads on these 
securities tend to comove strongly with the spreads on the underlying bonds. 
In the second model, I investigate the leading indicators of sovereign defaults on an 
annual panel of 43 emerging countries from 1996 to 2014. I estimate the model by a binary 
logistic regression. Finally, I implement a classification method based on this model, which 
predicts the probability of each country to default in the following year and classifies it 
accordingly. 
I find that global factors (such as the U.S. yield curve and the U.S. equity market) and 
country-specific factors (such as inflation, the depreciation rate of the local currency and the 
credit rating assigned to the issuer) are the main drivers of sovereign CDS spreads. The effect 
of all these variables, though, varies both across regions and over time. On the other hand, 
country-specific fundamentals (especially the soundness of public finances, the development of 
the banking sector and the recent history of past defaults, as well as the quality of the ESG 
factors) are strong signals of sovereign default risk. The classification method achieves overall 
good performances, correctly calling 96% of upcoming defaults while not leaving any sound 
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In the post-crisis environment of negative interest rates and growth stagnation, the 
attractiveness of emerging sovereign debt to global investors has steadily increased over the 
last decade. Conversely to the fragility of the public finances of several emerging market 
economies in the late 1990s and the early 2000s (notably, the distress following the 1997 Asian 
financial crashes, the 1998 Russian default and the 2001 Argentine default), in recent years 
sovereign issuers of emerging countries as a whole have shown greater resilience to episodes 
of financial turmoil. Such a statement holds, especially, when compared to the financial 
meltdown in the United States in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and the 
sovereign debt distress in Europe in the period 2010-2012.  
Moving from the enhanced confidence in investors’ risk attitudes towards emerging 
market economies, some researchers investigated the nature of this paradigm shift by studying 
the drivers of the two components of spreads. The first component relates to the risk premia 
attached by investors to sovereign bonds, whereas the second component refers to the pure 
default risk embedded into government securities. The former can be defined as the 
remuneration for the default risk to which investors are exposed; in this sense, it proxies the 
market perception of sovereign risk. It matters to investors as they wish to profit from potential 
mispricings in the market, especially to investors whose trading activity originates from a 
speculative motive. Some part of the academic literature on the topic attributes changes in 
sovereign risk premia to shifts in global factors (McGuire & Schrijvers, 2003; Pan et al., 2008; 
Longstaff et al. 2011), while another strand emphasises the role of country-specific differentials 
(Hilscher & Nosbusch, 2010; Afonso et al., 2014; Aizenman et al., 2016). Other papers analyse 
the interlinkages across spreads over time, pointing out the spillovers and contagion effects 
arising in periods of financial distress (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Caporin et al.; 2018). The 
latter component of spreads concerns the assessment of the default risk of a sovereign issuer. 
This measure is also of primary importance to investors, particularly to those participating in 
the market for a hedging motive. Most of the studies in this field identify weaknesses in the 
banking sector (Acharya et al. 2014; Gennaioli et al., 2014) or in the external position of a 
country (Eichengreen & Hausmann, 1999; Hofmann et al., 2019), respectively, as the main 
causes of sovereign defaults. Some authors (such as Manasse et al., 2003; Hilscher & Nosbuch, 
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2010; Jeanneret & Souissi, 2016) look at the recurrent patterns leading to defaults and build 
early-warning indicators based on such information. 
In this work, I adopt the perspective of an international investor wishing to assess the 
credit risk of sovereign issuers in emerging market economies. For this purpose, I explore both 
the components of spreads by applying two distinct econometric models. In the first model, I 
assess the causal effect of several global and country-specific factors on sovereign CDS spreads 
in emerging market economies.1 I estimate the model by fixed effects OLS panel regression. 
The model aims to calibrate the pricing of sovereign risk based on empirical evidence rather 
than on a structural approach. As this question is of major interest to speculative investors 
whose trading activity focuses on a short-run horizon, I employ data with monthly frequency. 
This choice constitutes a reasonable compromise between daily frequency on the one side, 
which provides the highest degree of granularity over time, and quarterly or annual frequency 
on the other, which has the advantage of larger data availability. I complement the first part 
with a principal component analysis (PCA), which quantifies the degree of cointegration 
between the individual series of spreads. In the second model, I inspect the role of a different 
set of global and country-specific factors on the probability of default of sovereign issuers in 
emerging countries. I estimate the model by a binary logistic regression. After the estimation, I 
adopt a classification method to predict the occurrence of a default in a given country in the 
following year. In this model, I employ annual data, as considerations about the sustainability 
of sovereign debt typically concern long-run investors driven by a hedging motive. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by building on the methodologies 
applied by previous research and expanding on them in a few directions. With respect to the 
model on the pricing of sovereign risk, it comprehends an extensive set of explanatory factors; 
it proposes a treatment for endogeneity, and it accounts for possible changes over time and 
across regions. For what concerns the model on sovereign defaults, it also considers a wide set 
of predictors. Specifically, it includes both the groups of variables accounting for weaknesses 
of the banking sector and external fragility. Furthermore, it adds extra-financial information to 
the usual set of predictors, embedding the ESG valuation of a country into the assessment of its 
sovereign default risk. Finally, it provides a quite accurate classification tool to discriminate 
sovereign issuers between more and less prone to default. 
Overall, the results of this study indicate that sovereign CDS spreads tend to move 
primarily according to changes in international risk factors (notably, the U.S. equity market and 
                                                          
1 I adopt sovereign CDS spreads (rather than sovereign bond spreads) as a proxy for the pricing of sovereign credit 
risk. I will justify this choice in the literature review in Section 1. 
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the U.S. yield curve). Some country-specific factors also play a relevant role: namely, the 
variables related to the monetary policy of a country, both on the internal and the external side 
(inflation and the depreciation rate of the local currency, respectively), and its sovereign 
creditworthiness. However, the influence of some of these variables varies over time and across 
regions. On the other side, the deterioration of country-specific fundamentals especially seems 
to lead to sovereign defaults. Domestic financial fundamentals (such as the levels of general 
government debt, domestic bank credit to the private sector and the soundness of the banking 
sector), as well as extra-financial performances (in terms of the ESG scores), are the main 
determinants of sovereign debt sustainability. Furthermore, current defaults to domestic 
creditors and past defaults to international creditors help predict upcoming external defaults. 
The external position of a country appear as less relevant as a whole, the only significant 
predictor being the depreciation rate of the local currency. Finally, although there is no clear 
evidence that international factors systematically affect the probability of default, the global 
financial crisis caused an upwards shift in sovereign default risk. 
The thesis is organised as follows. In Section 1, I review the literature in the specific 
field, distinguishing between the strand related to the drivers of sovereign spreads and the other 
strand concerning the determinants of sovereign defaults. In Section 2, I explain the 
methodology adopted in the two models. In Section 3, I introduce the datasets and some 
descriptive statistics. In Section 4, I report the results of the estimation of the models and the 
classification. Finally, in the last Section I draw some conclusions. 
 
4 
1    Literature review 
 
Before proceeding to analyse the different positions proposed in the literature, I will underline 
a few methodological notes relating to my own research and justifying the scope of the 
following literature review. First, when generically referring to sovereign spreads, I mean 
government bond yields or sovereign CDS returns interchangeably. There exists some 
empirical evidence that the two measures of sovereign risk are indeed substitutes, both in 
emerging markets (Ammer & Cai, 2010) and in the EMU (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012). 
Second, this literature review focuses on foreign currency sovereign debt. Despite the 
remarkable growth in local currency sovereign bond markets after the 2000s2, I decided to limit 
my attention to the specific features of foreign currency sovereign risk as foreign currency debt 
still constitutes the largest fraction of general government debt in emerging countries and the 
related literature is substantially larger.3 Third, although the scope of my model is limited to 
emerging market economies, this literature review includes analyses of advanced countries. 
Indeed, previous research on the sovereign debt crisis in the EMU provides meaningful insights 
for this study too, especially considering the increasing degree of integration of current financial 
markets (Amstad et al., 2016). Fourth, I focus on the empirical literature on the determinants of 
the pricing of sovereign credit risk, thus neglecting most of the contribution of theoretical 
pricing models. Finally, there exist multiple strands of literature about sovereign credit risk, but 
I will only explore those strands that more directly relate to the purposes of the thesis. 
Specifically, I will examine previous academic contribution on the following two research 
questions: the first question assesses the determinants of the pricing of sovereign credit risk 
(Section 1.1), while the second one analyses the drivers of sovereign defaults (Section 1.2). 
 
                                                          
2 For an overview of the historical trends and the currency composition of the market, see Burger et al. (2012) and 
Ottonello and Perez (2019). 
3 The only exception consists in those studies based on a sample of countries from the EMU, wherein the sovereign 
bonds under consideration are denominated in local currency. However, differently from other local currencies, 
international markets consider the euro as a hard currency (such as the Swiss franc or the Japanese yen). Thus, the 
currency risk associated with euro-denominated instruments is comparable to that of their dollar-denominated 
counterparts. 
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1.1 Determinants of sovereign spreads4 
1.1.1 Historical context 
The academic debate on the pricing of the risk embedded in sovereign bonds can be traced back 
to the Merton (1974) credit risk model. However, its structural framework, originally conceived 
for corporate debt, is not fully applicable to its sovereign counterpart (Augustin et al., 2012, p. 
120). Indeed, while the contingent-claim analysis provides a theoretical pricing model for 
economic defaults (i.e. due to an objective inability of the firm to pay back its obligations), the 
analysis of sovereign debt introduces a subjective element, as the government can strategically 
default at its own discretion (thus configuring an unwillingness of the issuer to pay).5 
Although sovereign debt in emerging countries experienced unprecedented growth rates 
between the 1970s and the 1980s, the formal discussion on the pricing of sovereign bonds at 
the time was still narrow. Indeed, the increasing interest in emerging debt was largely due to 
the boom in the market for syndicated bank loans to developing countries, notably to Latin 
American countries.6 In principle, pricing a loan is different from pricing a bond though, as the 
risk structure of the former is not fully comparable to the one of the latter (Eichengreen and 
Mody, 1998, p. 1). Banks can perform more efficient monitoring of the debtor’s ability to pay 
back its obligations than other investors can. Moreover, bonds typically benefit from a higher 
level of seniority than other debt securities, while the legal status of bank loans tends to be more 
variable.7 
The process of recognition of the peculiar features of sovereign bonds developed along 
with the inception of the market for Brady bonds and the introduction of indices of secondary 
market bond spreads in the early 1990s.8 As the integration process of domestic markets into a 
                                                          
4 This section extends the literature review by Augustin (2012) in the directions undertaken by more recent studies. 
5 For a more recent implementation of a contingent claim analysis on sovereign risk, see Gray et al. (2007). 
6 A notable exception, tracing a comparison between bank loans and bonds, is represented by Edwards (1986), 
which still gives more attention to bank lending though. In fact, the paper reports that the amount of new bank 
loans granted to 50 developing countries between 1978 and 1984 accounts for ten times the newly issued bonds, 
thus justifying the larger interest in the former than in the latter. 
7 Although there is no theoretical reason to assume that bonds and loans are priced in the same way, Kamin and 
Von Kleist (1999) argue that, while empirically bonds have larger spreads than comparable loans in levels, their 
responses to changes of several explanatory variables do not differ materially. 
8 Brady bonds were dollar-denominated sovereign bonds issued by the governments of some developing countries 
following the 1989 Brady plan (named after the U.S.Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady). This agreement allowed 
debt restructuring in those countries whose sovereign debt had suffered from severe impairment losses. The 
outcome of the restructuring was the securitisation of non-performing bank loans into Brady bonds. For more 
information on the specific instrument and the position of each developing country adhering to the plan, see Federal 
Reserve (2011, Section 4255.1). 
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global financial market was still developing and the information on emerging economies was 
limited, it seemed natural to identify rating agencies as the main sources of information on 
sovereign creditworthiness. Indeed, Cantor and Packer (1996) document a close relationship 
between credit ratings, macroeconomic variables and sovereign bond spreads, thus claiming 
that ratings reflect all the publicly available information on countries’ fundamentals. At the 
same time, though, they show that credit ratings carry additional private information, as they 
also have an independent effect on sovereign spreads. 
Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of the market for Brady bonds, along with the burst 
of the 1994 financial crisis in Mexico, raised questions among the analysts about the true 
information content of credit ratings: “Serious financial institutions are buying billions of 
dollars of long-term bonds from countries that five years ago were regarded as economic 
disaster areas. Moreover, they have been buying them at razor-thin margins over U.S. Treasury 
bond yields” (The Financial Times, 1997, reported in Kamin and Von Kleist, 1999). Indeed, 
while acknowledging the relevant effect of credit ratings on sovereign spreads, Kamin and Von 
Kleist (1999) provide evidence of a general declining trend of the spreads of various sovereign 
bonds throughout the 1990s for both the ends of the credit quality spectrum. Furthermore, the 
authors find the spreads compressed during that period “by more than can be explained by 
improvements in risk factors – credit ratings and maturity – alone” (p. 42). In the context of this 
general descending path, they also document a temporary divergence between speculative-
grade and investment-grade bonds after the Mexican crisis. While the former experienced an 
upward shift in the risk premium attached by the market, the spreads of the latter steadily 
decreased without interruptions throughout the period, as by comparison they were perceived 
as safer. The evidence of a differential impact of the Mexican crisis on the spreads, conditional 
on the prior characteristics of the countries, is confirmed by the study based on the secondary 
market for Brady bonds reported by Barbone and Forni (1999). Moreover, their findings include 
tentative evidence of contagion, i.e. an increase in the correlations between the spreads of 
different countries in periods of financial distress.  
These three unexplained elements – namely: the common influence on sovereign 
spreads over and beyond what explained by credit ratings; the cross-country evidence of 
differential factors other than just ratings; and the evidence of contagion – stimulated three 
directions in the literature, respectively. The first element motivates the interest in global factors 
as drivers of sovereign bond spreads. I will discuss it in Section 1.1.2. The second element 
points to the contribution of country-specific factors, which I will present in Section 1.1.3. 
Finally, the third element originated the research on potential changes in the cointegration 
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properties between the spreads of different countries in times of financial distress. I will 
comment on this field of research in Section 1.1.4. 
 
1.1.2 Global factors 
While recognising a relevant role of country-specific fundamentals, some researchers question 
their exhaustiveness as drivers of sovereign spreads. These authors tend to emphasise a 
significant impact of systemic risk factors instead. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) apply a 
sample selection model à la Heckman (1979) to a sample of emerging countries in order to 
study both the probability of issuance and the spread at launch. The authors highlight that 
changes in market sentiment unrelated to fundamentals tend to move primary spreads (i.e. 
spreads at the time of issuance, as opposed to spreads on the bonds traded in the secondary 
market) by large amounts in the short run. The principal component analysis by McGuire and 
Schrijvers (2003) corroborates this finding: a single common factor accounts for one third of 
the total variance in daily spread changes in the secondary market. They observe the presence 
of this factor for both speculative-grade and investment-grade bonds, indicating that it may be 
attributable to the international investors’ tolerance for risk. 
Other authors identify global factors as predominant drivers of sovereign spreads, 
especially in the short run. Pan and Singleton (2008) build a structural model extracting 
information about the risk of default and the recovery process from the term structure of 
sovereign CDS spreads in emerging countries. This approach allows them to distinguish 
between one component of the spread linked to pure default risk and the other related to the 
risk premium attached by the market. Their principal component analysis documents that a 
single factor explains 96% of the daily variation in the spreads. Therefore, they claim that 
sovereign spreads in emerging countries tend to comove strongly according to changes in the 
international investors’ risk appetite. In particular, when turning to an econometric analysis they 
find that risk premia are affected by market volatility (as proxied by the VIX index9) and high-
yield bond spreads. By applying the same methodology to a larger sample of advanced and 
emerging countries reporting monthly frequency data, Longstaff et al. (2011) witness a 
proportion of variance due to the first component of 64%. They also argue that global factors 
(notably, the U.S. equity market, the high-yield bond market and the level of volatility implied 
by the VIX index) not only drive the risk-premium component of the spread but also – and even 
                                                          
9 The VIX index, provided by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), measures market expectation of near 
term volatility conveyed by stock index option prices. 
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more strongly – the default-risk component. However, the authors suggest caution in 
generalising their results, as they mainly refer to the pre-crisis period of global abundant 
liquidity and reaching for yield; country-specific factors may turn out to be more important in 
other periods. Fender et al. (2012) apply a model accounting for volatility clustering to the daily 
time series of sovereign CDS spreads and perform separate analyses for the pre-crisis period 
and the crisis period. They confirm the overall dominance of global factors over local factors, 
notably the U.S. bond market, equity market and high-yield market, as well as the bond market 
in other emerging economies. However, differently from Longstaff et al. (2011), they find that 
country-specific factors had a significant role only before the global financial crisis, but they 
ceased to exert any effect during the crisis and its aftermath. Amstad et al. (2016) provide 
additional evidence in favour of a leading role of a time-varying common factor, identified in 
their study with the risk appetites of global investors. Moreover, by extending the analysis to 
the period of relative calm in the financial markets following the crisis, they document the 
presence of a “new norm” wherein sovereign bond spreads in emerging economies are even 
more cointegrated than they were before the crisis. They suggest this shift in the cointegration 
regime to be due to the prevalent role of index-tracking funds in current investment practices. 
For a summary table of the main studies focusing on global factors, see Table 1.1 in the 
Appendix. 
 
1.1.3 Country-specific factors 
A larger strand of literature supports the tight linkages between country fundamentals and 
sovereign spreads. Remolona et al. (2008) provide a transitional study between these two views, 
i.e. the one leaning towards a global determination of sovereign spreads and the other 
supporting a local explanation. They split the spread between a default risk component and a 
risk premium component based on the expected losses implied by sovereign credit ratings. They 
find that country-specific fundamentals (and inflation especially) drive the probability of 
default, whereas global factors (such as market volatility and investors’ risk appetite) affect the 
risk premium component of the spread. A different in-between position is the one reached by 
Comelli (2012), who finds that country fundamentals tend to be systematically significant, 
while the relevance of global factors varies across time and regions. The author also states that 
the effect of fundamentals is larger in relatively tranquil periods, whereas in periods of distress 
it is still present but smaller. 
1.1 Determinants of sovereign spreads 
9 
As emerging market economies as a whole have shown greater resilience after the global 
financial crisis (Aizenman et al., 2016), the sovereign debt crisis in Europe started in 2010 has 
diverted the attention of many researchers from the former group of countries to the latter. 
Specifically, that some countries (notably the so-called GIIPS countries) experience a persistent 
and larger spread vis-à-vis other countries within the same currency area (notably Germany) 
has raised interest in the idiosyncratic factors behind the differential dynamics of the spreads. 
Among the studies based on a sample of countries from the EMU, several papers point out the 
responsibility of the fiscal authority in determining spreads. Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) 
emphasise the importance of the quality of fiscal institutions in compressing sovereign bond 
yields. Aizenman et al. (2013) outline the role of fiscal space as a primary driver of sovereign 
CDS spreads, along with other macroeconomic factors (namely inflation). Afonso et al. (2014) 
confirm the significant effect of fiscal fundamentals on sovereign bond spreads. However, they 
report that after the crisis the market started pricing a basket of risks not previously 
compensated by the spreads, notably the risk of the crisis’ transmission, international risk and 
liquidity risk. 
Similar analyses based on emerging countries highlight that the most relevant 
fundamentals in these economies are a mix of external and internal variables. As outlined by 
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), in principle it makes sense that external factors are more 
important in emerging countries than in advanced countries, because their domestic markets are 
smaller and their economies typically rely on commodity exports. Consequently, these authors 
stress the effect of terms-of-trade and its volatility as major drivers of sovereign bond yields. 
Ho (2016) finds that external factors (namely the level of international reserves, external debt 
and the current account balance) are significant long-term determinants of sovereign CDS 
spreads. Presbitero et al. (2015) adopt a sample selection model and find that both external 
fundamentals (namely the level of international reserves and the current account) and the fiscal 
space matter for the pricing of sovereign risk. Aizenman et al. (2016) build on this view and 
identify distinct patterns of sovereign CDS spreads over time and across geographic areas. They 
claim that external factors (and trade openness especially) were more important drivers before 
the global financial crisis, as in general a higher degree of interdependence with the rest of the 
world amplifies the impact of external shocks on the domestic economy. In the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, instead, the markets assigned larger weights in their valuation models to 
the diverse mixes of fiscal and monetary policies adopted by the governments to counter the 
consequences of the crisis. Turning to the size of regional sovereign spreads, they report that 
Latin American countries tend to borrow at a systematically higher cost than Asian countries 
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(as also suggested by Longstaff et al., 2011), and this gap widened as a consequence of the 
crisis. 
Finally, a recent strand of literature focuses on the effect of ESG factors on sovereign 
spreads. Indeed, there exists some evidence that standard credit rating methodologies do not 
fully incorporate extra-financial information (Allianz Global Investors, 2017). Capelle-
Blancard et al. (2019) carry out a study on a sample of OECD countries and find that overall 
ESG scores are significant determinants of sovereign risk and, consequently, of sovereign 
spreads. By splitting the overall ESG score into its three components, they pinpoint that the 
governance score exerts the largest effect; the social score has a smaller effect; whereas the 
environmental score does not affect spreads at all. Margaretic and Pouget (2018) perform a 
similar analysis on a sample of emerging market economies and report analogous evidence, i.e. 
sovereign spreads embed information on the ESG scores as a whole, but not on the 
environmental component alone. Furthermore, the dynamic approach of the study reveals some 
complex causal effects: while positive changes in the governance factor contemporaneously 
affect the spreads as new information is released, improvements in the social factor initially rise 
the spreads and lower them after some time. The authors claim the reason for the 
contemporaneous effect of the governance factor to be its widespread use in the current 
valuation models of international investors. On the other hand, they motivate the lagged 
influence of the social factor by suggesting that the market overstates the financial costs of 
social improvements in the short run, eventually recognising their benefits to the public finances 
in the long run. For a summary table of the literature on the country-specific determinants of 
sovereign credit risk, see Table 1.2 in the Appendix. 
 
1.1.4 Spillovers and contagion 
Some of the recent literature analyses the spillover effects and contagion between the sovereign 
spreads of different countries. Several papers (Longstaff et al., 2011; Fender et al., 2012; 
Amstad et al. 2016) suggest the existence of time-varying correlations across the spreads 
throughout periods of financial turmoil. When analysing the specific field of research though, 
it is worth pointing out that the results are largely dependent on the different methodologies 
employed by the authors (Augustin, 2012, p. 16). 
Among those studies based on broad samples of advanced and emerging market 
economies, the research by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) provides an analytical distinction 
between three different types of contagion. The first type is fundamentals contagion, arising 
1.1 Determinants of sovereign spreads 
11 
from an intensification of the sensitivity of the markets to macroeconomic fundamentals. The 
second type is regional contagion, characterised by an increase in risk spillovers across 
countries within the same region. The third type is herding contagion or pure contagion, defined 
as a temporary cross-country dependence in the unexplained variance (i.e. the residuals from 
the regression of sovereign risk). The results of the country fixed effects estimation include 
systematic evidence of fundamentals contagion after the global financial crisis, especially for 
what concerns the GIIPS countries. Conversely, regional spillovers decreased in the aftermath 
of the crisis, particularly in the euro area. Overall, these results indicate a shift in the drivers of 
cointegration from geographical proximity and economic relationships to a discriminatory role 
of country fundamentals. There is some spot evidence of herding contagion, but this is more 
concentrated in time and geographically. Wu et al. (2016) focus on the distinction between 
regional contagion and global risk spillovers by the means of a multifactor asset pricing model 
based on the results from a generalised principal component analysis. They document the 
occurrence of immediate regional contagion following an extreme spike in the sovereign CDS 
spread of a country. The consequences of credit events reach the global level too, but at a slower 
pace. The regional effects appear to be mainly driven by country-specific fundamentals, 
whereas the global effects are explained by investors’ attitudes towards risk and debt levels. 
The European sovereign debt crisis prompted a large number of enquiries specifically 
addressing the linkages within the EMU. By implementing standard panel estimation 
techniques, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) show evidence of contagion corresponding to the 
sovereign debt crisis in the EMU. They also document a shift corresponding to the global 
financial crisis: from a cointegration regime due to a “convergence hypothesis” between the 
centre and the periphery of the euro area to a more differentiated regime based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals and international risk (in line with Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013). 
Caporin et al. (2018) argue that the previous evidence in favour of contagion may be due to the 
implicit assumptions of linear regression techniques. Indeed, by adopting a quantile regression 
approach, they do not find any evidence of shift-contagion following the European debt crisis. 
Instead, they do find some signs of contagion in the EMU after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in the fall of 2008, but, surprisingly, in a negative sense (i.e. the synchronisation of the spreads 
of the euro area decreased rather than increasing in the wake of the crisis). Their interpretation 
is that the markets anticipated the upcoming fiscal distress in the euro area immediately after 
the outbreak of the financial crisis in the United States. For a summary table on the previous 
research on spillovers and contagion effects across sovereign spreads, see Table 1.3 in the 
Appendix. 
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1.2 Determinants of sovereign defaults 
We can distinguish two conceptually different strands in the literature on the determinants of 
sovereign defaults. One strand is more concerned with the causes of sovereign defaults from an 
ex-post perspective. In other words, it inspects the pre-existing factors that determine the 
occurrence of a default. Its main objective is to explain the underlying reasons for which debt 
crises occur. Therefore, it usually adopts a causal, theoretical, thematic and backwards-looking 
approach. These studies usually build theoretical models based on some a priori knowledge, 
which they subsequently test by linear regression techniques in order to check their consistency 
with real-life data. I will analyse this field of literature in Section 1.2.1.  
Another strand focuses on the information content of some variables from an ex-ante 
perspective. The purpose, in this case, is to identify some recurring patterns in related variables 
shortly before past crises in order to predict the occurrence and the timing of future crises. 
Compared to the other strand of literature, this kind of research adopts more of a descriptive, 
empirical, methodological and forward-looking approach. This field of research usually 
employs early-warning signals based on methodologies such as generalised linear models, 
event study analyses or machine learning algorithms. I will discuss these studies in Section 
1.2.2. 
 
1.2.1 Causes of sovereign defaults 
Some authors underline the fragilities arising from unbalanced currency and maturity 
composition of a country’s public debt. The seminal paper by Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999) introduces the concept of “original sin” with respect to the sovereign debt crises occurred 
throughout the 1990s (notably, in Mexico in 1994; in South-East Asia in late 1997; and in 
Russia in 1998). The authors define the original sin as “a situation in which the domestic 
currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically” (p. 3). 
The root cause of this situation lies in the large unwillingness of international investors to hold 
local currency bonds issued in emerging and developing countries, as they fear that 
opportunistic devaluations may erode the real value of their bonds. Domestic issuers, then, are 
left with two alternatives. The first choice is borrowing in foreign currency; however, this 
choice exposes them to currency risk in the case of a depreciation of the local currency, as their 
assets are denominated in local currency while their liabilities in foreign currency. The second 
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choice consists in borrowing short term, but this exposes them to refinancing risk in the case of 
a rise in the domestic interest rates, as their assets have longer maturities. Thus, in the presence 
of the original sin hypothesis, the balance sheets of domestic issuers (including sovereign 
issuers) are unavoidably unbalanced in the sense of either a currency mismatch (i.e. assets 
denominated in local currency and liabilities denominated in foreign currency) or a maturity 
mismatch (i.e. long-term assets and short-term liabilities). Both the mismatches eventually lead 
to a deterioration in the country’s resilience to external shocks, as a currency crisis can easily 
trigger a debt crisis. 
The recent empirical evidence on the original sin hypothesis emphasises that it may have 
disappeared over the last two decades as emerging countries have managed to rebalance the 
currency and maturity composition of their public debt. Ottonello and Perez (2019) report that 
local currency sovereign bond markets have steadily grown over the past decade, although 
foreign currency sovereign debt still represents the majority of the current outstanding amount. 
They attribute the gradual disappearance of the original sin to the progressive stabilisation of 
growth and inflation in these economies. Jeanneret and Souissi (2016) perform separate 
analyses for local currency and foreign currency debt, respectively. They observe a substantial 
similarity in the default rates of the two categories of debt. Moreover, they do not find any 
significant relationship between the fraction of foreign currency debt and the probability of 
default. Nevertheless, they find that maturity mismatches (as proxied by the fraction of short-
term external debt) still impinge on the probability of default. 
Moving from the evidence that local currency borrowing in emerging market economies 
has steadily climbed in recent years, Carstens and Shin (2019) propose a new version of the 
original sin hypothesis called “original sin redux”. This alternative formulation of the 
hypothesis states that, because of the rebalancing in the currency composition of debt in these 
countries, their balance sheets do not bear the risks arising from currency mismatches anymore. 
Nevertheless, these risks have not disappeared, but they have shifted to the international 
investors’ balance sheets instead. Indeed, as international investors typically have liabilities 
denominated in their home currency, a depreciation of the assets denominated in the local 
currency of an emerging country results in net portfolio losses to these investors. Since they 
typically face risk constraints in their portfolio allocation, when the depreciation rates exceed a 
certain level the constraints become binding. Consequently, they will rebalance their portfolio 
away from those countries wherein the local currency is subject to large depreciations. This 
means that even if emerging countries do not bear the risks from currency mismatches anymore, 
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they can still suffer from the financial instability arising from the capital outflows following a 
depreciation of the local currency. 
Other researchers focus on the vulnerabilities due to the linkages between the domestic 
financial sector and sovereign debt (i.e. the sovereign-bank nexus). Acharya et al. (2014) model 
an “Irish style” type of debt crisis, wherein the risk transmission channel runs from the banks 
to the sovereign. They recognise bank bailouts as a source of sovereign risk, as the government 
finances the bailouts by issuing new debt. Furthermore, an increase in sovereign risk, in turn, 
inflates bank credit risk, both directly via the government bonds held by banks, and indirectly 
via the explicit or implicit government guarantees on banks. Thus, they claim the existence of 
a “diabolic loop” between the public sector and the private sector, i.e. an intervention of the 
government in order to ensure the solvency of banks in the short run ends up increasing the 
credit risk of both public and private debt in the long run. While in their framework it is the 
financial weakness of the private sector impinging on the public sector, in Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) the reference is rather to a “Greek-style” type of debt crisis, wherein the risk 
transmission channel runs from the sovereign to the banking system. In their model, the 
incentive for a government to default is lower as creditor rights are stronger, banks hold more 
government bonds, and private capital inflows are larger, as the costs of default to the private 
sector increase with these factors.  
The evidence provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), based on the historical database 
from the same authors covering over two centuries of data, partially reconciles the strand of 
literature concerned with external fragilities with the other strand exploring the sovereign-bank 
nexus. The authors run some causality tests and establish that external debt crises tend to 
anticipate banking crises, which in turn help to predict sovereign defaults. As a concluding 
remark, notwithstanding the difficulties in disentangling the exact causal linkages between 
these types of crises (currency crises, banking crises and sovereign defaults), it is important to 
note that they often occur together. For a summary table on the causes of sovereign defaults 
identified in the literature, see Table 1.4 in the Appendix. 
 
1.2.2 Early-warning signals of sovereign defaults 
Another strand of literature examines the predictors signalling the occurrence of a debt crisis. 
Manasse et al. (2003) employ two alternative models in order to predict debt crises one year 
before they occur, i.e. a pooled logit model and a classification tree. From the logit model, they 
infer a close correspondence between the economic intuition and the empirical evidence. Both 
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solvency (namely the level of external debt over GDP) and liquidity measures (namely the level 
of short-term debt over GDP and external debt-service payments) matter for the prediction of 
upcoming sovereign defaults. Other relevant early-warning variables are various country-
specific imbalances, both external (such as a low current account balance) and internal (such as 
low output growth, a high level of inflation and high inflation volatility); from a global 
perspective, investors’ confidence matter too. Finally, political uncertainty also affects the 
probability of default. Among those studies employing a pooled logit model, Hilscher and 
Nosbusch (2010) confirm the significance of both solvency and liquidity measures, adding to 
the former the distance in time since the last default. Compared to Manasse et al. (2003), their 
analysis emphasises the role of external imbalances: the authors claim that these variables have 
a substantial impact, particularly on open emerging market economies, as they are more 
dependent upon international markets than advanced economies. Accordingly, they stress the 
importance of the volatility of the terms-of-trade and the level of official reserves as proxies of 
resilience to external trade shocks and international capital flows, respectively. Jeanneret and 
Souissi (2016) corroborate previous findings for what concerns output growth, the level of 
sovereign indebtedness and the maturity of the external debt. In addition, they include among 
the significant predictors the level of domestic investment. Differently from previous studies 
though, they do not observe any significant effect of governance factors (namely political 
instability and government effectiveness) on the probability of default. Thus, they conclude that 
sovereign defaults on foreign currency debt seem to be driven by an inability-to-pay motive 
rather than by an unwillingness-to-pay motive. Pescatori and Sy (2007) apply a panel logit 
model, instead, but confirm most of the results of comparable studies. 
Other researchers focus their attention on the methodological issues related to the 
construction of early-warning models. Moving from the observation that empirical results tend 
to vary considerably among different papers, Chakrabarti and Zeaiter (2014) propose an 
extreme bound analysis in order to test the robustness of previous results to alterations in the 
conditioning information set. Indeed, they highlight that the effect of some variables (namely 
creditworthiness, output growth, leverage on export earnings, debt service, and inflation) is 
robust to different specifications. On the other hand, the estimates on other variables (such as 
trade openness, central bank liabilities, interest payments, cost of borrowing, imports, exports, 
per capita GNP, and government stability) appear to be highly sensitive to small alterations in 
the conditioning information set. Dawood et al. (2017) compare the forecasting performances 
of various econometric techniques (namely the binary logit model, the multinomial logit model, 
and the dynamic signal extraction approach) by separately applying each of them to different 
world regions. They show that the binary logit model outperforms the alternative models both 
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for in-sample and for out-of-sample forecasting. From an empirical point of view, they 
emphasise the importance of including the spillover effects from the banking sector and the 
foreign exchange market among the predictors. Finally, Holopainen and Sarlin (2017) also 
perform a horse race among several alternative early-warning models for financial crises, but 
in this case, the competition is between conventional statistical and econometric techniques on 
one side and machine learning algorithms on the other. The former type of classification 
methods includes, for instance, the logit model, which – as I have documented above – is often 
employed in the literature, while the latter type gathers advanced techniques, such as k-nearest 
neighbours, neural networks and ensemble methods. They document that the latter type of 
classification methods tends to outperform the former type, thus invoking future economic 
research to make more extensive use of machine learning for early-warning purposes. For a 




2    Methodology 
 
2.1 Determinants of sovereign spreads 
In the first model, I assess the causal effect of different factors on the monthly sovereign CDS 
spreads of 19 emerging market economies from January 2007 to July 2019. I consider a wide 
set of explanatory variables, either globally or locally determined. For each independent 
variable, I will now provide a brief discussion of the rationale, references in the literature and 
the expected sign of the respective coefficient. 
 
2.1.1 Global determinants 
 VIX index (absolute change). An increase in the VIX index (which is a proxy of the 
volatility in international financial markets) may cause an upward shift in the portfolio risk of 
global investors. Therefore, they may pull out of riskier investment and direct their funds to 
“safe havens”, which in turn would cause an increase in the borrowing costs of emerging 
countries. Thus, I expect it to carry a positive coefficient (within the vector of coefficients 𝜷𝟏 
related to the global factors in Equation 2.2). 
 U.S. effective federal funds rate (basis points, absolute change). 10 The effective federal 
funds rate is a proxy for the whole yield curve. A reduction in the U.S. interest rates may signal 
a contractionary phase in the global economy, thus starting capital flights away from riskier 
emerging countries. At the same time, however, lower interest rates in the U.S. may divert 
investments from the mainland to more attractive opportunities in emerging countries. Because 
of the debate in the literature about its sign11, I decide not to make any conjecture on the 
expected sign. 
 S&P500 stock index (percentage change). The major stock index provides a proxy of 
the market expectations about the future growth of the U.S. economy. Positive stocks 
                                                          
10 The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds (balances held at 
the Federal Reserve) with each other overnight. The effective federal funds rate is the weighted average rate for 
all of these types of negotiations. 
11 See McGuire and Schrijvers (2003, p. 76) for a review of the empirical findings on the sign of the U.S. interest 
rates. 
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performances may increase investors’ confidence in debt sustainability in emerging economies, 
thus lowering their borrowing costs. Therefore, I expect an associated negative coefficient. 
 
2.1.2 Country-specific determinants 
 Industrial production index (seasonally adjusted, percentage change). This index 
provides the highest-frequency measure of the state of the real economy of a country (Remolona 
et al., 2008). Steady growth may contribute to the sustainability of sovereign debt. Therefore, I 
expect it to show a negative relationship with the CDS spreads (within the vector of 
coefficients 𝜷𝟐 related to the country-specific factors in Equation 2.2).  
 Consumer Price Index (CPI, percentage change). The inflation rate carries information 
about the monetary policy and, to some extent, about the fiscal responsibility of the government 
and financial stability of a country (Remolona et al., 2008). Even if the real value of foreign 
currency debt is not subject to monetisation, the creditworthiness of a sovereign issuer may still 
suffer from prolonged and sustained levels of inflation. Hence, I expect it to have a positive 
causal effect on CDS returns. 
 Commodity terms-of-trade index (percentage change). The weighted ratio of net export 
prices over import prices indicates the ability of a country to generate dollar revenues and to 
pay back its external debt (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010). Therefore, I expect it to exert a 
negative impact on CDS returns. 
 Nominal exchange rate (units of local currency per U.S. dollar, percentage change). As 
pointed out by the recent study of Hofmann et al. (2019), an appreciation of the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar loosens financial conditions in the emerging 
economy and compresses sovereign credit risk spreads, both in local currency and foreign 
currency. Therefore, I expect a positive coefficient to be associated with an increase in the 
exchange rate (depreciation of the local currency). 
 Currency volatility (percentage change). I also add to the variation in the exchange rate 
the per cent change in the 30-days local currency volatility. My hypothesis is that the markets 
may require an additional premium to cover potential risks arising from fluctuations in the value 
of the local currency. The impact of volatility is also emphasised by Hilscher and Nosbusch 
(2010) with respect to commodity prices. Hence, I expect the coefficient to have a positive sign. 
 Foreign official reserves (absolute change). Official reserves measure the liquidity of 
the government: they determine its ability to shield its currency against excessive fluctuations 
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and to repay its short-term foreign currency debt (Remolona et al., 2008). Hence, I expect to 
see a negative relationship with sovereign CDS returns. 
 Domestic stock index (percentage change). Local stock market returns may provide 
insight into the future growth of a country and attract investments from abroad (Longstaff et al. 
2011). I expect positive returns to affect CDS spreads negatively. 
 Credit rating (consensus, absolute change). I introduce a credit rating measure in the 
spirit of Remolona et al. (2008). It comprehends not only ratings per se but also credit reviews, 
which include outlooks and watches. The purpose of considering reviews is to capture changes 
in the creditworthiness of a sovereign issuer at a higher frequency than those implied by rating 
changes, so that the current valuation already discounts expected future changes. Furthermore, 
this timely measure combines ratings from S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch to create a consensus 
among the major agencies. In order to build this measure, I perform a linear transformation of 
the credit ratings assigned by each agency to a numeric scoring system from 1 to 20, where 1 
represents the lowest rating and 20 the highest (similarly to Afonso et al., 2012; see Table 2.1 
in the Appendix for a conversion table among the original rating scales). Then, for each agency 
I compute a weighted average analogous to the one proposed by Remolona et al. (2008), 
according to the formula: 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = {
0.7 × 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔0𝑖𝑡 + 0.3 × 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠
0.4 × 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔0𝑖𝑡 + 0.6 × 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
 (2.1) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 is the comprehensive measure for country i in month t, 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔0𝑖𝑡 is the current 
rating assigned to the country and 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑖𝑡 is the current rating adjusted by one notch 
depending on the direction of any pending outlook or watch. The probability weights are those 
indicated by the authors after discussions with credit analysts. Accordingly, a future change in 
the rating is considered more likely in the case of a watch than an outlook. Finally, I take the 
average between the three ratings to obtain the final consensus rating. 
 
2.1.3 Specification 
In the baseline specification, I construct a dynamic fixed effects regression as the following: 
 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +𝜷𝟏′𝜟𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐′𝜟𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (2.2) 
where the dependent variable 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of the dollar-denominated 5-year sovereign 
CDS returns of country i in month t; 𝜟𝑮𝒊𝒕 is the vector of global shocks; 𝜟𝑭𝒊𝒕  is the vector of 
country-specific shocks; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. I choose a dynamic fixed effects 
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specification as it encompasses many of the subject-specific features outlined in the literature 
review. Indeed, as sovereign CDS returns exhibit strong persistence over time (Afonso et al., 
2014), I include the first lag of the dependent variable among the predictors.12 Moving from the 
findings of Longstaff et al. (2011), I conjecture that global factors play a major role. Hence, I 
account for global shocks by adding a vector of predictors 𝜟𝑮𝒊𝒕 (reported in Section 2.1.1). I 
also take into account a set of shocks in country-specific fundamentals 𝜟𝑭𝒊𝒕 (reported in Section 
2.1.2) in order to model dynamic heterogeneity across countries. Finally, I consider country-
specific individual effects 𝑢𝑖  to capture time-invariant heterogeneity across countries (as in 
Comelli, 2012). 
I estimate the model by several panel estimation techniques, taking care of different 
issues possibly affecting the dataset (namely serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence). While treating the global variables as exogenously determined, I take 
into consideration the possibility that country-specific shocks may be driven by sovereign CDS 
spreads (i.e. reverse causality). Hence, I provide an alternative instrumental variable (IV) 
approach in order to deal with potential endogeneity issues. 
 
2.2 Determinants of sovereign defaults 
In the second model, I predict the probability of an external sovereign default in the following 
year based on a wide set of countries’ characteristics and global financial conditions in the 
current year. I employ yearly frequency data in order to identify the structural features that may 
trigger a default and signal its arrival. In a sense, while the model on the determinants of 
sovereign spreads aims to predict the short-run changes in the market pricing of sovereign risk 
as a whole (as composed by default risk and the risk premium attached by investors), the 
purpose of this model is to isolate the long-run default risk component. In addition to some of 
the previous country-specific predictors, I include among the explanatory variables several 
other socio-demographic and economic factors, which I will now briefly present. 
 
                                                          
12 Nickell (1981) shows that including the lagged dependent variable among the predictors introduces a bias in the 
fixed effects panel estimation. However, as Afonso et al. (2014) point out, the size of the bias declines as the time 
dimension T of the panel increases, to the extent that it is already quite small when T=20 (Hallerberg and Wolff, 
2008). Since in my dataset the average T=144, I decide to ignore the bias (as Afonso et al., 2014, do with the same 
time dimension). See Bruno (2005) for a quantitative assessment of the size of the bias in unbalanced datasets. 
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2.2.1 Country-specific determinants 
 Population (logarithm). Larger countries may show greater resilience to any 
shortcoming in the repayment of their debt and some may even benefit from a “too-big-to-fail” 
logic. Therefore, I expect to see a negative coefficient (within the vector of 
coefficients 𝜷𝟐 related to the country-specific factors in Equation 2.4). 
 GDP (percentage change). GDP growth is one of the direct drivers of the public debt-
to-GDP ratio as, ceteris paribus, it automatically decreases the level of the ratio, thus improving 
sovereign debt sustainability. Hence, I expect it to carry a negative coefficient. 
 Domestic credit to the private sector from banks (as a percentage of GDP). The size of 
the banking sector is a proxy for the level of financial development (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 
1995). Intuitively, financially developed economies are more likely to have greater access to 
international capital flows. Furthermore, Gennaioli et al. (2014) show that sovereign defaults 
are costlier in those markets where the financial system is more developed, as banks’ holdings 
of sovereign bonds are typically larger and the level of creditor protection is higher. Thus, the 
incentive for a sovereign issuer to default is lower in those countries. Therefore, I expect the 
size of the banking sector to have a negative effect on the probability of default of the sovereign. 
 General government debt (as a percentage of GDP). The stock of public debt may be 
deemed unsustainable if the market expects it to take an explosive path in the long run. 
Therefore, I expect it to enter the specification with a positive coefficient. 
 Overall budget balance (as a percentage of GDP). The overall budget balance (i.e. 
comprehensive of interest payments) determines the pace of convergence (or divergence) of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio over time. Following the logic of the general government debt, it should 
affect the probability of default in a negative sense. 
 Resource-rich country (dummy). I adopt the binary indicator introduced in an IMF 
(2012) paper. A country with abundant natural resources is more likely to ensure debt 
sustainability through international trade and privatisations. Therefore, I expect to see a 
negative relationship. 
 Banking crisis (dummy). Some papers (Acharya et al., 2014) identify the implicit 
guarantee by governments on bank losses (the so-called sovereign-bank nexus) as a significant 
and self-reinforcing determinant of increasing sovereign debt burdens. Therefore, when a 
banking crisis is ongoing in the country, it should increase the probability of sovereign default. 
 Domestic default (dummy). An ongoing domestic default (i.e. a default of the sovereign 
issuer to domestic residents) may trigger upcoming shortfalls on external debt repayments too. 
Thus, I expect its coefficient to have a positive sign. 
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 ESG rating. In order to capture extra-financial information about countries, I include 
among the predictors an overall ESG rating obtained as a weighted average of three distinct 
governance, social and environmental scores, each of them ranging between 1 and 100. The 
weights assigned to these factors are 50%, 25% and 25%, respectively. I expect this overall 
score to have a negative relationship with the probability of default. 
 Current account balance (as a percentage of GDP). As it mirrors the capital and financial 
account balance in the balance of payments of a country, the current account balance provides 
information on the direction of international capital flows. Capital inflows relax the government 
financing needs, whereas capital outflows deteriorate its external position. Hence, I expect the 
current account balance to carry a negative coefficient. 
 Volatility of the commodity terms-of-trade index (percentage). In addition to the per 
cent change in the net export price index already introduced in the first model, here I also 
consider the 12-month level of volatility of the same index. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) find 
that higher uncertainty in international commodity prices tends to inflate refinancing risk in 
exporting countries. Thus, I expect this volatility measure to drive the probability of default 
positively. 
 Currency crisis (dummy). A large short-term depreciation of the local currency may 
trigger defaults on foreign currency denominated debt and deteriorate the creditworthiness of a 
government. Hence, I expect it to exert a positive effect. 
 Indicator of distance in time since the last default. I build an indicator similar to the one 
used by Jeanneret and Souissi (2016) to account for the history of external defaults of a country. 
It ranges from 1 to 100, wherein 1 means the last default in the country is more distant in time, 
while 100 means the country is currently in default. It is based on the formula: 
 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  
100
(1 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡)
 (2.3) 
where 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the indicator for country i in year t and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the 
number of years since the last default (capped at 99 if larger). As in Jeanneret and Souissi 
(2016), it decays rapidly and approaches 1 after a few years, meaning that I assume the memory 
of the market of past defaults is not persistent. I expect it to have a positive coefficient. 
 Number of regional defaults in the last five years. I include this variable to capture 
regional clustering effects in sovereign defaults. I expect the related coefficient to carry a 
positive sign. 
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2.2.2 Specification 
I estimate the model by a binary logistic regression (following Jeanneret and Souissi, 2016). In 
the baseline specification, the marginal probability of default is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑡(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 = 1) =
1
1 + exp [−(𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏′𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐′𝑭𝒊𝒕 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡)]
 (2.4) 
where 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a default occurs in country i in year t+1; 
as in the model on sovereign spreads, 𝑮𝒊𝒕 and 𝑭𝒊𝒕 represent vectors of global and country-
specific factors, respectively, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. The vector of global 
variables contains many of the factors already included in the first model (defined in Section 
2.1.1). The only differences are that the VIX index and the effective federal funds rate now 
enter in levels (as opposed to changes) and I drop the S&P500 returns due to multicollinearity 
issues. The vector of country-specific fundamentals adds the explanatory variables reported in 
Section 2.1.2 to some of the factors already included in the model for sovereign spreads; I refer 
the reader to the estimation of the model in Section 4.2 for the full list of country-specific 
factors. 
After the estimation, I evaluate the prediction power of the model as a binary classifier 
by training it on a subsample period (training set) and assessing its performances on the 
remaining sample (test set). I derive the classification method from the review of early-warning 
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3.1 Determinants of sovereign spreads 
3.1.1 Data selection 
I employ two unbalanced panel datasets, one for each model. The first dataset includes monthly 
data from January 2007 to July 2019 and covers all the 19 countries in the Bloomberg Barclays 
Emerging Markets Local Currency Liquid Government Index (see Table 3.1 in the Appendix 
for a full list of countries). I collected data on end-of-period dollar-denominated 5-year 
sovereign CDS returns from Bloomberg. The choice of studying sovereign CDS spreads rather 
than government bond yields is supported by the literature. While reporting mixed evidence 
from previous studies, in the literature review by Augustin (2014) the author stands in favour 
of larger informational efficiency in the credit derivative market, as bid-ask spreads tend to be 
smaller than in the underlying bond market and price discovery is faster in markets showing 
higher levels of liquidity. Moreover, I focus on sovereign CDS contracts with a 5-year maturity, 
an asset class usually regarded as the most liquid across the whole term structure. For a full 
definition and references to the sources of the data included in the set of independent variables, 
please see Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Sources and definitions of the data employed in the model of sovereign CDS spreads. 
Variable Definition Source 
CDS Dollar-denominated 5-year sovereign CDS spread (in basis points). Bloomberg 
VIX Average VIX index. FRED 
Fed funds Average U.S. effective federal funds rate (in basis points). FRED 
S&P500 S&P500 index closing price. Yahoo! Finance 
Industrial Industrial production index (seasonally adjusted). GEM 
Prices Consumer Price Index. IFS 
Terms-of-trade Net export price index. CTOT 
Exchange rate Nominal bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar (units of local 




30-day volatility of the exchange rate (% of the value of the currency). Bloomberg 
Reserves International reserves (in months of imports). GEM 
Stocks Domestic stock index closing price. GEM, Bloomberg 
Rating Comprehensive measure of credit rating (see Section 2.1.2). Bloomberg 
Note. All the data have monthly frequency. 
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3.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 3.3 I display some descriptive statistics from the full sample for the first model. 
Focusing on sovereign CDS spreads, we can observe that the respective variable stands, on 
average, at 135 basis points. It also shows considerable variance, as the standard deviation is 
equivalent to more than half the mean (77 basis points). 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of the full sample. 
   Obs.   Mean St. dev.   Min.   25% Median   75%   Max. 
CDS 3019 134.94 77.07 38.47 76.80 117.37 173.30 324.82 
VIX 3163 18.86 8.65 10.13 13.49 16.24 21.24 62.64 
Fed funds 3163 124.61 165.03 7.00 12.00 22.00 195.00 526.00 
Δ log S&P500 2888 0.54 3.76 -7.78 -1.76 1.08 3.17 6.67 
Δ log Industrial 2846 0.23 1.88 -3.65 -0.88 0.32 1.34 3.98 
Δ log Prices (inflation) 2888 0.30 0.37 -0.33 0.02 0.27 0.53 1.10 
Δ log Terms-of-trade 2888 0.01 0.35 -0.66 -0.19 -0.02 0.18 0.79 
Δ log Exchange rate (depreciation) 2888 0.16 2.71 -4.73 -1.54 -0.08 1.70 6.05 
Δ log Currency volatility 2904 -0.52 27.61 -50.08 -19.59 -1.28 18.03 55.22 
Reserves 2864 10.30 6.51 1.06 5.70 8.16 13.70 35.87 
Δ log Stocks 2888 0.17 5.67 -11.61 -3.47 0.57 4.10 10.16 
Rating 3059 12.81 2.51 7.33 11.00 12.67 15.00 17.67 
Note. In column: number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum value, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
percentile and maximum value of each variable (in row). The sovereign CDS spreads and the effective federal 
funds rate are expressed in basis points. The VIX index, the level of reserves and the credit rating are in absolute 
terms (see Table 2.1 in the Appendix for a conversion table among the original credit rating scales). All the 
logarithmic differences (measuring growth rates) are in percentage. All the country-specific continuous variables 
have been winsorised at a 5% level (2.5% on each tail) to control for the presence of outliers.  
 
In order to disentangle the portion of variance related to the time dimension and the 
other due to the cross-sectional dimension, in Figure 3.1 I plot the original (not winsorised) 
series of the sovereign CDS returns from January 2007 to March 2020 gathered in different 
graphs by region. From a visual inspection, the most noticeable feature of the series concerns 
their volatility over the sample period (time dimension). Indeed, we can clearly spot some 
historical events that had a major resonance on all the spreads contemporaneously. We can 
observe the largest spikes in almost all the series from the end of 2008 to the beginning of 2009, 
as a consequence of the peak of the global financial crisis. We can also appreciate the sizeable 
degree of cointegration of the series during the crisis. After the crisis, sovereign CDS returns 
tended to diverge more because of the greater relevance assigned by investors to local factors 
in tranquil times (Amstad et al., 2016). Some notable exceptions to this otherwise diverging 
process are the widespread increase during the 2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis; the 
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minor jump following the taper tantrum crisis in mid-2013; and the sharp rise in the first quarter 
of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All these periods of increased cointegration between 
the spreads are associated with episodes of turbulence in the financial markets, again in line 
with the evidence from Amstad et al. (2016). Some upwards shifts in the individual time series 
are attributable to idiosyncratic rather than systemic factors. I will just point out a few examples. 
CDS spreads in Hungary and Romania were more affected by the European sovereign debt 
crisis than other countries. Several Latin-American governments bore substantially higher 
funding costs during the recession in Brazil of 2014-2016. The spread on Russian sovereign 
CDS shows a spike corresponding to the 2014 political crisis in Ukraine. Finally, Turkey 
experienced hiking levels of sovereign spreads following the political tensions of recent years. 
Figure 3.1: Monthly sovereign CDS spreads by region and reference entity, in basis points. 
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The remarkable cointegration properties between the series derive from their strong 
dependence on common factors. Indeed, in Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 in the Appendix, I 
document that the series of the average sovereign CDS returns exhibits high correlations with 
some global variables widely adopted in the literature. Specifically, these are the VIX index 
(Figure 3.2 in the Appendix), the U.S. effective federal funds rate (Figure 3.3 in the Appendix), 
and the S&P500 index (Figure 3.4 in the Appendix). In the case of the VIX index, the 
correlation coefficient is positive (0.81), as an increase in market volatility inflates sovereign 
credit risk as well. On the opposite, the correlation coefficients with the U.S. effective federal 
funds rate and the S&P500 index are negative (-0.49 and -0.50, respectively). While the 
interpretation of the correlation coefficient corresponding to stock market returns is 
straightforward (the borrowing costs of emerging market economies benefit from improving 
world growth prospects), the explanation behind the correlation coefficient accounting for the 
U.S. yield curve is multifaceted. I will discuss it further in Section 4, when evaluating the results 
from the model. 
While changes in the spreads closely relate to shocks in global financial variables, the 
overall divergence process in the levels of the spreads reflects the heterogeneity of the countries 
in the sample (cross-sectional dimension). In order to visualise it, in Figure 3.5 I plot the cross-
sectional averages of some sovereign CDS spreads by region over time. Specifically, I only 
show three regions: East Asia and Pacific (shortened to “Asia” for simplicity); Latin America 
and the Caribbean (“Latin America”); and Europe and Central Asia (“Europe”).13 We can see 
that during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis the regional average series move close one to 
each other. In the peak of the crisis (from the end of 2008 to the beginning of 2009), though, 
the series for Europe stood at a substantially higher level, possibly reflecting the market 
expectations of upcoming fiscal distress in the area (Caporin et al., 2018). During the European 
sovereign debt crisis, both the series for Asia and Latin America remained at a comparable 
level. However, from 2014 onwards the two series have diverged considerably, reshaping a 
traditional regional spread (Aizenman et al., 2016). Strikingly, even after the end of the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the CDS based on the sovereign debt of European countries 
continued offering, on average, larger risk premia than those related to the sovereign debt of 
Asian countries, perhaps indicating permanent effects of the crisis on their borrowing costs. 
  
                                                          
13 The average series for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa are excluded because they are 
less representative, as both are computed on one individual series only (South Africa and Israel, respectively). 
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Figure 3.5: Average sovereign CDS spreads by region over time, in basis points. 
 
Note. The three regions under consideration are: East Asia and Pacific (“Asia”), Latin America and Caribbean 
(“Latin America”), and Europe and Central Asia (“Europe”; see Table 3.1 in the Appendix for the regional 
classification of the countries). 
 
Indeed, Table 3.4 confirms that Asian sovereign CDS constitute a benchmark for 
comparisons between regions: Asian sovereign CDS offer, on average, smaller risk premia with 
respect to both Latin American spreads (larger by 18.28 basis points) and, even more largely, 
to European spreads (larger by 46.48 basis points). I will now explore more in detail the nature 
of the regional differences between Europe and Asia, and Latin America and Asia, respectively. 
Over the period, industrial production in Latin America grew substantially less than in Asia 
(-0.32%); the European differential, instead, is not significant. Prices in Asia were more stable 
than in the other two regions: on an average annual basis, they increased by 3% over the whole 
period, while the same indicator recorded a 4% annual growth both in Europe and in Latin 
America. From an external perspective, the commodity terms-of-trade index slightly 
deteriorated in Asia, while the same figure showed minor improvements in Europe and Latin 
America. This suggests that the role of terms-of-trade in determining spreads may be limited. 
Other indicators related to the external position, such as the depreciation and the volatility of 
the local currency, do not significantly differ. The differences in international reserves (in 
months of imports) are significant in both cases, but show opposite signs. On average, the 
European monetary authorities had smaller reserves than their Asian counterparts did; in turn, 
Asian authorities held smaller reserves than their Latin American counterparts did, revealing 
some ambiguity of the relationship between reserves and sovereign spreads14. Finally, the credit 
                                                          
14 See Bianchi et al. (2018) for a quantitative model on the optimal level of international reserves in the presence 
of sovereign default risk. 
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rating of Asian sovereign issuers was, on average, higher by almost one notch than European 
and Latin American countries. These figures altogether indicate that Asian countries have 
managed to address some of the imbalances leading to the local financial crashes of the late 
1990s. On the opposite, while the regional spread to Latin American countries is widely 
documented in the literature, the one concerning European countries may be of more recent 
establishment, perhaps reflecting some persistent effect of the European sovereign debt crisis 
(Wu et al., 2016). 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics by region. 
 Europe   Latin America Asia Europe – Asia Lat. Am. – Asia 
   Mean S. d. Mean S. d. Mean S. d. Diff. P-val. Diff. P-val. 
CDS 161.13 92.15 132.94 64.20 114.66 62.92 46.48 0.000 18.28 0.000 
Δ log Industrial 0.27 1.72 0.06 1.87 0.38 1.99 -0.11 0.192 -0.32 0.000 
Δ log Prices (Infl.) 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.36 0.09 0.000 0.09 0.000 
Δ log T-o-T 0.02 0.32 0.03 0.36 -0.01 0.37 0.03 0.016 0.04 0.030 
Δ log FX rate (Depr.) 0.22 3.04 0.21 2.93 0.07 1.95 0.15 0.219 0.14 0.269 
Δ log Curr. vol. -0.11 24.38 -0.06 29.23 -1.03 30.11 0.93 0.474 0.97 0.509 
Reserves 7.42 6.69 12.96 6.69 11.09 5.44 -3.67 0.000 1.87 0.000 
Δ log Stocks -0.03 6.19 0.11 5.92 0.36 5.14 -0.39 0.145 -0.25 0.367 
Rating 12.22 2.41 12.49 2.21 13.30 2.74 -1.08 0.000 -0.81 0.000 
Note. The three regions under consideration are East Asia and Pacific (“Asia”), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(“Latin America”) and Europe and Central Asia (“Europe”; see Table 3.1 in the Appendix for the regional 
classification of the countries). For each regional group, I report the mean and the standard deviation. Furthermore, 
I report the statistical difference between the mean of Europe and Asia, and the mean of Latin America and Asia, 
respectively, along with the p-value from a t-test computed on each of these differences. The sovereign CDS 
spreads are expressed in basis points. The level of reserves and the credit rating are in absolute terms (see Table 
2.1 in the Appendix for a conversion table among the original credit rating scales). All the logarithmic differences 
(measuring growth rates) are in percentage. All the country-specific continuous variables have been winsorised at 
a 5% level (2.5% on each tail). 
 
Another interesting feature of sovereign CDS spreads concerns their relationship with 
sovereign credit ratings. It is worth noting from Table 3.3 that 75% of the observations in the 
sample refer to sovereign issuers exhibiting an investment-grade status (see Table 2.1 in the 
Appendix for a conversion of the ratings). In Figure 3.6 I show the box plots of sovereign CDS 
spreads by the median of the ratings (“consensus rating”) assigned to the issuer by Standard 
and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively, and the period under consideration. Specifically, 
I distinguish between the distress period covering the global financial crisis and the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe (2007-2012) and the more tranquil period thereafter (2013-2020). This 
distinction allows spotting at least two patterns in the data, one related to the differences across 
ratings and the other to the changes in their distribution over time. Looking at the differences 
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across ratings, the whole distribution of CDS spreads shifts towards lower levels as the rating 
climbs from speculative to investment grade. All the within-class distributions show a positive 
skew. However, both during and after the distress period, the variability within each rating class 
is generally lower for the investment-grade end of the rating spectrum and higher for the 
speculative-grade end. This indicates that the prices of sovereign CDS referring to high-rated 
countries reflect their own credit rating more accurately than the prices of the same asset class 
referring to low-rated countries do. We can also appreciate some general changes over time in 
the relationship between ratings and spreads. After the distress period, the distribution of the 
spreads within most of the rating classes (the top quartiles, especially) tends to shift towards 
lower levels than during the crises. Moreover, the variance within each rating class diminished 
after the crises. Both of these general trends are attributable to the time-varying risk attitudes 
of investors. However, there seems to be an exception: while for all the investment-grade and 
some speculative-grade sovereign CDS (equal to and above BB+) both the median and the 
variance of the spreads have decreased after the crises, the respective distributional measures 
of the very low end of the speculative-grade spectrum (below BB+) seem to have increased 
instead. I interpret this descriptive evidence in the light of potential changes in the production 
and interpretation of credit ratings. Indeed, the distress period caused a sudden and widespread 
downgrading of sovereign credit ratings (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission, 2011). This 
process may have restored investors’ confidence in the investment-grade end of the sovereign 
credit quality spectrum, as it cleaned these classes up of the weakest assets. At the same time, 
though, it may have not eliminated the inherent adverse selection issue, shifting the related 
uncertainty to the speculative-grade end of the spectrum instead. 
Figure 3.6: Sovereign CDS spreads by credit rating class and period, in basis points. 
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Note. Along the horizontal axis, I display the box plots representing the distribution of sovereign CDS spreads, 
gathering observations by the median credit rating class assigned by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch (on 
the vertical axis) and the period under consideration (in legend). The box in the middle of each thin line includes 
the central 50% of the distribution (included between the 25th and the 75th percentile, named Q1 and Q3, 
respectively), while the vertical line in the middle of the box indicates the 50th percentile (median, Q2). The left 
end of the thin line indicates the minimum value larger than Q1-1.5×(Q3-Q1), while the right end indicates the 
maximum value smaller than Q3+1.5×(Q3-Q1). The dots not lying on the thin line represent extreme values, i.e. 
outside the range included between Q1-1.5×(Q3-Q1) and Q3+1.5×(Q3-Q1). 
 
3.2 Determinants of sovereign defaults 
3.2.1 Data selection 
The second dataset records annual data from 1996 to 2014 on 43 emerging countries (of 
which 14 are also included in the first dataset; see Table 3.5 in the Appendix for a full list of 
the countries in the second dataset). I retrieved data on external sovereign defaults from the 
historical database on financial crises constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). In particular, 
I adopt the strictest definition of default among those provided by the authors, which only 
accounts for defaults to private creditors, thus excluding defaults to official creditors (see Table 
3.6 in the Appendix for a list of defaults). The definitions and the sources of the data for the 
independent variables included in the second model (in addition to the ones already defined in 
Table 3.2) can be found in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Sources and definitions of the data employed in the model of sovereign external defaults. 
Variable Definition Source 
Default Dummy equal to 1 if the sovereign issuer is in default to 
external private creditors in the current year. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 
Financial crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the year is 2007 or 2008. - 
Population Population (in millions). WEO 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (in millions of U.S. dollars). WEO 
Credit Domestic credit to the private sector from banks (% GDP). WDI 
Public debt General government debt (% GDP). WEO 
Budget balance Overall budget balance (% GDP). WEO 
Resource rich Dummy equal to 1 if the country is rich in natural resources. IMF (2012) 
Banking crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the government bails out one or more 
banks in the current year. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 
Domestic default Dummy equal to 1 if the sovereign issuer is in default to 
domestic private creditors in the current year. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 




Current account Current account balance (% GDP). WEO 
Terms-of-trade volatility 12-month volatility of the net export price index. CTOT 
Currency crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the annual depreciation rate vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar is larger than 15% in the current year. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 
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Variable Definition Source 
Last default Indicator accounting for the number of years since last default 
(see Section 2.2) 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 
Regional defaults Number of sovereign issuers in external default in the region in 
the previous five years. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) 
Reserves International reserves (in months of imports). WDI 
Foreign currency debt Foreign currency debt (% total public debt). IDS 
Short-term debt Short-term external debt (% total external debt, both public and 
private). 
IDS 
Note. All the data have annual frequency. 
 
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 3.8 I display some descriptive statistics from the full sample for the second model. We 
can observe that, on average, the number of defaults in the sample is quite modest, amounting 
to only 13% of the sample in the period 1996-2014. In Figure 3.7 in the Appendix, I plot the 
same ratio by year over the extended period 1975-2016, so as to provide some perspective over 
time. The fraction of countries in default is in line with the relative frequency of currency crises 
(13%) and banking crises (11%), feeding into the hypothesis that there might be some linkages 
among these types of financial distress (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). In order to visualise the 
extent to which these three types of crises are interrelated over time, in Figure 3.8 in the 
Appendix I display the fraction of defaults contemporaneously accompanied by both a currency 
crisis and a banking crisis; a banking crisis only; a currency crisis only; or no other crisis at all 
(i.e. pure sovereign defaults), respectively. As in Figure 3.7, I consider a longer time interval 
(1975-2014) in order to appreciate the dynamics in the data. 
Table 3.8: Summary statistics on the full sample. 
     Obs.   Mean St. dev.   Min.   25%   50%   75%   Max. 
Default 712 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
VIX 712 21.12 6.09 12.81 15.48 22.36 25.60 32.69 
Fed funds 712 2.40 2.20 0.09 0.16 1.67 4.96 6.24 
Financial crisis 712 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Population 712 101.73 265.20 1.19 9.79 26.46 61.24 1,367.82 
Δ log GDP (GDP growth) 712 4.55 3.23 -5.16 2.91 4.56 6.48 10.79 
Δ log Prices (Inflation) 712 7.75 8.21 -0.25 3.21 5.52 9.36 51.46 
Credit 712 37.73 27.67 4.42 18.10 29.12 49.76 111.59 
Public debt 712 47.20 24.91 8.43 29.78 42.63 61.09 137.39 
Budget balance 712 -2.20 3.27 -10.70 -4.20 -2.21 -0.30 6.66 
Resource rich 712 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Banking crisis 712 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Domestic default 712 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ESG 712 50.67 8.72 29.18 46.15 50.38 55.46 71.81 
Current account 712 -1.13 5.77 -18.31 -4.39 -1.79 1.79 14.83 
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     Obs.   Mean St. dev.   Min.   25%   50%   75%   Max. 
Δ log Terms-of-trade 712 0.27 4.62 -38.01 -1.00 -0.07 0.99 49.71 
Terms-of-trade volatility 712 1.01 1.84 0.03 0.28 0.49 1.02 30.83 
Currency crisis 712 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Last default 712 39.14 38.03 1.00 8.33 20.00 100.00 100.00 
Regional defaults 712 3.74 3.01 0.00 1.00 3.00 7.00 12.00 
Δ log Exchange rate (Depr.) 701 4.19 10.66 -9.73 -1.55 1.64 7.03 48.14 
Reserves 666 5.66 4.80 0.42 3.05 4.46 6.60 36.78 
Foreign currency debt 633 93.61 9.43 30.13 91.79 97.55 99.50 99.83 
Short-term debt 633 14.99 8.82 0.00 8.71 13.30 19.67 34.44 
Note. In column: number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum value, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
percentile and maximum value of each variable (in row). The indicators for external default, financial crisis, 
richness in natural resources, banking crisis, domestic default and currency crisis are dummy variables. The VIX 
index, population (in millions), the ESG score, the volatility of the terms-of-trade, the indicator for the distance 
since last default (see construction in Section 2.2), the number of defaults in the region in the previous five years 
and the level of reserves are in absolute terms. The effective federal funds rate is in percentage. All the logarithmic 
differences (growth rates) are in percentage. Domestic credit from banks, public debt, overall budget balance, 
current account and foreign currency public debt are in percentage of GDP. Short-term debt is in percentage of 
total external debt. All the country-specific continuous variables have been winsorised at a 5% level (2.5% on each 
tail) to control for outliers. 
 
From a closer examination of the economic fundamentals reported in Table 3.8, we can 
recognise a few peculiar traits of emerging market economies, in most of the cases 
corresponding to common sense. By looking at the internal macroeconomic variables, I 
document remarkable output growth rates, and even larger inflation rates, on average. In the 
top 75% of the sample, the annual real GDP growth rate exceeds 3%; in the top half of the 
distribution, it is even larger than 4.5%. Nevertheless, extreme negative shocks in output are 
also considerably large (-5%), indicating substantial market risk. Along with the noticeable 
output growth rates, another typical feature of emerging market economies relates to the 
persistent and sustained levels of inflation. Indeed, while the risk of deflation seems to be almost 
null (the minimum observed value is close to 0), the top half of the sample records inflation 
rates above 5.5%, and the top 25% experiences double-digit rates. Despite the winsorisation, 
some extreme spikes are still present (more than 50%). 
When considering the external position of these countries, I witness, on average, a 
decline in the value of their own currencies over the period, matched by current account deficits 
in their international balance sheets. This deterioration is partially compensated, on average, by 
adequate levels of international liquidity (as measured by the level of foreign exchange reserves, 
expressed in months of imports) and by favourable dynamics in the international commodity 
prices. In line with the large observed inflation rates, the distribution of the nominal 
depreciation rate tends towards positive values and shows a positive skew, indicating 
3    DATA 
34 
widespread – and, in some cases, extreme – declines in the value of the local currencies of 
emerging market economies vis-à-vis hard currencies. In the bottom 25% of the sample, though, 
we can observe the tendency of some local currencies to appreciate rather than depreciate, 
probably associated to the positive and often large current account balances achieved by 25% 
of the sample. On average, countries in the sample exhibit both a budget balance deficit (-2.2% 
as a ratio over GDP) and a current account deficit (-1.1% as a ratio over GDP), in line with the 
“twin deficits” hypothesis of a positive correlation between the two. Nonetheless, the average 
amount of reserves almost reaches a level equivalent to six months of imports, which is double 
the minimum level of three months suggested as a rule of thumb by the IMF (2011)15; only 25% 
of the sample falls below this threshold. Furthermore, emerging countries generally benefitted 
from a relative increase in their export prices compared to their import prices over the period, 
as indicated by the positive average change in the commodity terms-of-trade index. This 
possibly relate to the fact that more than one third of the countries in the sample is rich in natural 
resources. Another distinctive feature consists in the fraction of foreign-currency debt over total 
debt, which is well above 90% in 75% of the sample, thus confirming its overall preponderance 
in the currency composition of the sovereign debt in emerging market economies (Ottonello 
and Perez, 2019). 
By inspecting the distribution of the variables, we can detect some elements of 
heterogeneity within the classification as emerging market economies. We can spot large 
differences especially among the fixed characteristics of the countries in the sample, i.e. those 
varying the least over time. For instance, some notable differentials are in socio-economic 
variables such as population, domestic credit to the private sector from banks, general 
government debt and the ESG factors. I will now analyse more in detail the heterogeneity in 
the sample by separately reporting the characteristics of two distinct groups (Table 3.9). The 
first group is composed by the observations related to the countries not being in default in the 
following year (either not starting a default or exiting a current default status). The second group 
includes the observations from those countries being in default in the following year (either 
staying in the default classification if they are currently defaulting, or entering a default if they 
are not). 
  
                                                          
15 While suggesting complementing this simple rule with more comprehensive approaches, the paper does not 
dismiss it, as there exists some empirical evidence in favour of its adoption. 
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Table 3.9: Summary statistics by defaulting countries and non-defaulting countries in the following 
year, respectively. 
 Not defaulting in the next year Defaulting in the next year   
     Obs.   Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev. Diff. P-val. 
VIX 618 21.02 6.12 94 21.75 5.86 -0.74 0.261 
Fed funds 618 2.38 2.21 94 2.57 2.12 -0.19 0.425 
Financial crisis 618 0.12 0.32 94 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.770 
Population 618 113.66 282.54 94 23.34 30.29 90.31 0.002 
Δ log GDP (GDP growth) 618 4.65 3.01 94 3.88 4.35 0.77 0.102 
Δ log Prices (Inflation) 618 7.35 7.27 94 10.38 12.52 -3.03 0.024 
Credit 618 41.25 27.87 94 14.61 8.76 26.64 0.000 
Public debt 618 43.62 21.43 94 70.77 32.39 -27.15 0.000 
Budget balance 618 -2.36 3.35 94 -1.15 2.47 -1.22 0.000 
Resource rich 618 0.35 0.48 94 0.45 0.50 -0.10 0.085 
Banking crisis 618 0.10 0.30 94 0.21 0.41 -0.11 0.011 
Domestic default 618 0.02 0.13 94 0.18 0.39 -0.17 0.001 
ESG 618 52.39 7.49 94 39.36 7.77 13.03 0.000 
Current account 618 -0.88 5.47 94 -2.81 7.24 1.93 0.015 
Δ log Terms-of-trade 618 0.29 4.68 94 0.08 4.21 0.22 0.647 
Terms-of-trade volatility 618 1.01 1.91 94 1.04 1.36 -0.03 0.842 
Currency crisis 618 0.12 0.33 94 0.17 0.38 -0.05 0.270 
Last default 618 30.75 32.80 94 94.34 19.30 -63.59 0.000 
Regional defaults 618 3.58 3.08 94 4.78 2.27 -1.19 0.000 
Δ log Exchange rate (Depr.) 618 3.74 9.72 83 7.57 15.71 -3.83 0.033 
Reserves 605 5.82 4.92 61 3.99 2.95 1.84 0.000 
Foreign currency debt 539 93.74 9.65 94 92.84 8.00 0.91 0.329 
Short-term debt 539 15.45 9.05 94 12.38 6.79 3.07 0.801 
Note. In column: number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum value, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
percentile and maximum value of each variable (in row). The indicators for external default, financial crisis, 
richness in natural resources, banking crisis, domestic default and currency crisis are dummy variables. The VIX 
index, population (in millions), the ESG score, the volatility of the terms-of-trade, the indicator for the distance 
since last default (see construction in Section 2.2), the number of defaults in the region in the previous five years 
and the level of reserves are in absolute terms. The effective federal funds rate is in percentage. All the logarithmic 
differences (growth rates) are in percentage. Domestic credit from banks, public debt, overall budget balance, 
current account and foreign currency public debt are in percentage of GDP. Short-term debt is in percentage of 
total external debt.All the country-specific continuous variables have been winsorised at a 5% level (2.5% on each 
tail). 
 
We can see that the split analysis between defaulting and non-defaulting countries 
reflects many of the large variations already observed in the full sample analysis. Some of these 
differences, which I will now mention, appear to be highly significant. On average, countries 
exiting the default classification (or keeping out of such classification, if not currently in 
default) are larger in terms of population than defaulting countries. This may indicate that the 
sovereign debt of larger countries is more sustainable than the sovereign debt of smaller 
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countries simply because of stronger economic forces or perhaps because they benefit from a 
“too-big-to-fail” logic.  
Furthermore, it appears that the economic fundamentals of non-defaulting countries are 
in relatively better health conditions, both internally and externally. On the internal side, on 
average, the inflation rate is substantially lower (approximately by 3%). Private indebtedness 
to domestic banks on GDP is larger by 26% roughly, whereas the ratio of public debt over GDP 
is smaller in absolute value by more than 27%. This evidence supports the arguments of 
Gennaioli et al. (2014), who claim that the level of financial development of the private sector 
feeds into the sustainability of public debt. In turn, the reduced relative stock of public debt 
may be one of the reasons for more expansionary fiscal policies, as witnessed by the larger 
budget deficits on GDP, whose mean exceeds the same statistic computed on the defaulting 
group by 1.2% in absolute value. Finally, the overall ESG score is higher, on average, by 13 
points. 
On the external side, in line with the split evidence from inflation, the average 
depreciation rate of the local currencies of non-defaulting countries is lower by almost 4% in 
absolute terms, confirming the relatively more stable value of their currencies. Accordingly, on 
average, non-defaulting countries exhibit smaller current account deficits than defaulting 
countries by an absolute factor of almost 2%, while their level of foreign exchange reserves 
allows for two additional months of imports compared to the same measure from the other 
group. Surprisingly, the abundance of natural resources seems to be more common among 
defaulting (45%) than non-defaulting countries (35%), although the difference between the two 
groups is barely significant. The statistical insignificance of the differences in the variables 
associated with the original sin hypothesis (namely, the fraction of foreign currency debt over 
total debt and the fraction of short-term external debt over total external debt) is particularly 
striking, if considering the importance that some authors (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; 
Hofmann et al., 2019) attribute to these factors. I will further inspect their role when interpreting 
the results of the estimation of the model.  
Local and regional episodes of financial distress are also associated with an upcoming 
default or the perpetuation of the current default status. Notably, external sovereign defaults 
seem to be clustered both in time and within regions. Indeed, the probability of observing a 
default in a country in the following year decreases in the distance in time since the last year in 
which the country was in default. Furthermore, the probability increases in the number of 
countries in default in the previous five years within the same region. Moreover, there is a 
correlation between domestic defaults and external defaults, as countries not defaulting on their 
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external debt are 17% less likely to be in default to domestic creditors. I also report some 
interesting information about the association between different types of crises. Specifically, 
banking crises are associated with external sovereign debt crises in the following year. On the 
other hand, there seems to be no correlation between the occurrence of a currency crisis in a 
year and the triggering of a sovereign default in the following year. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that sovereign defaults do not exhibit any correlation 
with the VIX index, the U.S. yield curve, and the global financial crisis, respectively. In fact, I 
do not find any systematic difference in the global variables accounting for the financial cycle 
between the two groups. This suggests that, while international investors price global risk 
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4.1 Determinants of sovereign spreads 
4.1.1 Principal component analysis 
Before proceeding with the estimation of the model, I run a principal component analysis (PCA) 
on the time series of percentage changes in sovereign CDS returns over a subsample of 18 
countries (the Czech Republic was excluded due to limited data availability in the earliest 
years).16 
In Panel A of Table 4.1, I report the results of the PCA of the percentage changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads over the full sample period. Following Afonso et al. (2014), I will only 
explore those components whose associated eigenvalues are larger than or equal to 0.7 
approximately. Therefore, I will focus on the first three components. Overall, the evidence 
indicates that a large fraction of variance in the changes of sovereign CDS returns can be 
explained by a single common factor. In the full sample period, this fraction amounts to 65% 
of the total variance. The second component contributes to explain 14% of the total variance. 
Adding the third component yields a cumulative explained variance of 82%. In Panel B of the 
same table, I report the results of a PCA on percentage returns of the domestic stock indices of 
the countries in the sample, so as to provide some terms of comparison (as in Longstaff et al., 
2011). We can observe that the proportion of variance explained by each component is larger 
for changes in spreads than for stock returns. Furthermore, by following the eigenvalue rule, 
three components seem to be enough for spreads, whereas four components are required to 
explain stock returns. Therefore, I claim that sovereign CDS spreads in emerging countries 
appear to be more cointegrated than stock indices, at least at a monthly frequency (in line with 
Longstaff et al., 2011, and Fender et al., 2012). 
                                                          
16 Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique for data reduction. It consists of an optimisation 
problem that successively generates linear combinations of the data (principal components) with maximum 
variance, subject to a condition of orthogonality between different components. One of its main advantages with 
respect to traditional regression techniques are parsimony, as it allows fully explaining the dataset by the use of a 
smaller number of factors, and adaptiveness, meaning it does not require any a priori specification of the model as 
it autonomously extracts as much information as possible from the data. See Jolliffe and Cadima (2016) for a 
technical discussion. 
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Table 4.1: Results from PCA on the full sample period based on sovereign CDS spreads and domestic stock 
indices, respectively. 









First 11.697 9.262 0.650 0.650 
Second 2.435 1.738 0.135 0.785 
Third 0.698 0.193 0.039 0.824 
Fourth 0.505 0.074 0.028 0.852 
Fifth 0.431 0.089 0.024 0.876 









First 12.190 10.986 0.642 0.642 
Second 1.204 0.348 0.063 0.705 
Third 0.856 0.129 0.045 0.750 
Fourth 0.727 0.132 0.038 0.788 
Fifth 0.595 0.090 0.031 0.820 
Note. The PCA is based on the monthly series of the changes in sovereign CDS returns for N = 18 countries 
between January 2007 and July 2019 (T = 150). The first five principal components are reported in row. In Column 
1 I report the eigenvalue corresponding to the nth component. The eigenvalue indicates the proportion of variance 
explained by the nth component, whereby the total variance is normalised to N. In Column 2 I show the difference 
between the eigenvalue of the nth component and the eigenvalue of the (n+1)th component. In Column 3 I obtain 
the proportion of variance explained by the nth component alone (equal to the eigenvalue of the nth component 
divided by N). Finally, in Column 4 I report the cumulative variance explained by the first n components. 
 
In Table 4.2 I split the full sample period into three distinct periods. Then, I report the 
proportion of variance explained by each component and the cumulative variance up to the third 
component in each period. This exercise aims at spotting potential changes over time in the 
transmission mechanisms to sovereign CDS returns. Column 1 refers to the results for the full 
sample period, as reported in Table 4.1. Column 2 covers the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent recession (2007-2009). Column 3 relates to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
(2010-2012). Finally, Column 4 identifies the relatively tranquil period in financial markets 
following the European sovereign debt distress (ranging between 2013 and 2019). I detect some 
evidence of contagion in periods of financial turmoil. The importance of the first common factor 
peaked in the years of the global financial crisis, with the fraction of variance explained by the 
first component reaching more than 71%. This level remained substantially unaltered 
throughout the European sovereign debt crisis. It finally descended at a proportion close to 58% 
in the more stable years following the sovereign debt crisis. Because the impact of common 
factors seems to heighten during systemic crises, this evidence suggests the adoption of herding 
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behaviours by investors. Conversely, in tranquil times investors differentiate more across 
countries and country-specific factors play a greater role (Amstad et al., 2016). 











 Prop. Cum. Prop. Cum. Prop. Cum. Prop. Cum. 
First 0.650 0.650 0.717 0.717 0.712 0.712 0.578 0.578 
Second 0.135 0.785 0.143 0.860 0.135 0.847 0.110 0.688 
Third 0.039 0.824 0.029 0.890 0.038 0.884 0.072 0.760 
Note. The PCA is based on the monthly series of the changes in sovereign CDS returns for N = 18 countries 
between January 2007 and July 2019 (T = 150). The first three principal components are reported in row. Each 
column reports the proportion of variance explained by the nth component and the cumulative proportion of 
variance explained by the first n components for each period. Column 1 refers to the full sample period (2007 –
2019); Column 2 to the global financial crisis (January 2007 – December 2009); Column 3 to the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe (January 2010 – December 2012); and Column 4 to the following period of enhanced stability in 
global financial markets (January 2013 – July 2019). 
 
Another matter of interest is to assess any differential impact of common factors on 
different countries. Figure 1 shows the loadings (also called weighting vectors) of the first three 
principal components on each country. We can see that the first component loads similarly on 
almost all the countries. A few exceptions are some European countries (Poland and Romania) 
or not European but strongly connected to Western advanced economies (Israel), whereby the 
loading factor is much smaller. The second component captures the source of commonality 
among these three countries, while it almost amounts to zero for all the others. Following the 
approach of Longstaff et al. (2011), we can roughly interpret this as a regional spread between 
Europe and the other regions. To inspect the possibility that this regional spread is due to the 
European sovereign debt crisis started in 2010, I compute the loadings for the first component 
over different periods (Table 4.3). Indeed, I find that, while in general all the sovereign CDS 
returns moved in the same direction with the first component over the full sample period, in the 
period from 2010 to 2013 the time series for Israel, Poland and Romania tended to move in the 
opposite direction compared to those of all the other countries. The interpretation for the third 
principal component is somehow less intuitive. The only clear pattern can be found in the 
several positive weights on Asian sovereign CDS returns as opposed to the negative weights on 
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Figure 4.1: Loadings of the first three principal components on each country. 
 
Note. The PCA is based on the monthly series of the changes in sovereign CDS returns for N = 18 countries 
between January 2007 and July 2019 (T = 150). Panels A, B and C above show the loadings of the first three 
principal components, respectively (on the vertical axis), on each country series in the sample (on the horizontal 
axis), wherein each loading can be interpreted as a sort of correlation coefficient between the nth component and 
the series for the respective country. 
 









Brazil 0.264 0.261 0.270 0.268 
Chile 0.257 0.241 0.253 0.272 
China 0.244 0.250 0.263 0.206 
Colombia 0.272 0.260 0.269 0.291 
Hungary 0.227 0.253 0.198 0.185 
Indonesia 0.263 0.252 0.262 0.277 
Israel 0.015 0.051 -0.118 0.012 
South Korea 0.246 0.265 0.252 0.188 
Mexico 0.274 0.265 0.269 0.282 
Malaysia 0.268 0.256 0.266 0.277 
Peru 0.267 0.262 0.238 0.287 
Philippines 0.269 0.263 0.264 0.284 
Poland 0.052 0.085 -0.050 0.045 
Romania 0.077 0.086 -0.026 0.141 
Russia 0.252 0.251 0.268 0.242 
Thailand 0.248 0.248 0.246 0.241 
Turkey 0.236 0.255 0.253 0.224 
South Africa 0.263 0.255 0.260 0.271 
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Note. The PCA is based on the monthly series of the changes in sovereign CDS returns for N = 18 countries 
between January 2007 and July 2019 (T = 150). The table reports the loadings of the first component on each 
individual series (in row) over different periods (in column), wherein each loading can be interpreted as a sort of 
correlation coefficient between the first component and the series for the respective country. Column 1 refers to 
the full sample period (2007 –2019); Column 2 to the global financial crisis (January 2007 – December 2009); 
Column 3 to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe (January 2010 – December 2012); and Column 4 to the following 
period of enhanced stability in global financial markets (January 2013 – July 2019). 
 
As a last step of the PCA, I quantify the levels of correlation between the first three 
components and some global financial variables in the attempt to identify any of these as the 
sources of common variation (Table 4.4). To facilitate the interpretation, I gather the variables 
into four groups. The first group refers to the stock market performances. It comprehends 
percentage returns on the S&P500 index for companies based in advanced countries, as well as 
percentage returns on the MSCIEM index for companies based in emerging countries. The 
second group only includes financial markets volatility, as measured by the VIX index. The 
third group accounts for the U.S. yield curve. Changes in the effective federal funds rate, the 3-
month Treasury bill rate and the spread between the 10-year government bond and the 3-month 
Treasury bill (accounting for the slope of the yield curve) all belong to this category. Finally, 
the last group reflects information on high-yield bond spreads and includes changes in the 
Moody’s spread between BAA- and AAA-rated companies, changes in the North-American 
high-yield spread, and changes in the spread between BAA-rated companies and the 10-year 
U.S. government bond. We can observe a strong negative correlation between the first 
component and stock returns (both the S&P500 and the MSCIEM series). On the other hand, 
changes in the VIX index and the high-yield bond spreads also show a strong but positive 
correlation with the first component. The second component seems to correlate more with 
changes in the U.S. yield curve (negatively with the effective federal funds rate and the 3-month 
rate, positively with the term premium of the 10-year versus the 3-month Treasury rates). Again, 
it is also positively associated with changes in the high-yield bond spreads. The correlations of 
the third component mimic some pattern of both the first and the second components, but they 
are smaller in magnitude. Thus, they do not allow drawing any additional conclusion. 
 All in all, these results point toward a dominant role of global conditions in the pricing 
of sovereign risk. The state of the financial cycle in the U.S. market, as captured by stock 
returns, the yield curve and high-yield bond spreads, drives the largest part of the covariation 
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in emerging sovereign spreads.17 Finally, this common variation seems to amplify over periods 
of financial distress. 







Stock returns    
  Δ log S&P500 -0.749 -0.012 -0.101 
  Δ log MSCIEM -0.795 0.015 -0.000 
Volatility    
  Δ VIX 0.552 0.028 0.078 
Yield curve    
  Δ Overnight -0.237 -0.134 -0.031 
  Δ 3-month -0.269 -0.048 -0.112 
  Δ 10-year minus 3-month -0.020 0.103 -0.036 
Credit spreads    
  Δ BAA minus AAA 0.512 0.081 0.038 
  Δ North American high-yield 0.705 0.016 0.061 
  Δ BAA minus 10-year Treasury 0.603 0.088 0.072 
Note. The PCA is based on the monthly series of the changes in sovereign CDS returns for N = 18 countries 
between January 2007 and July 2019 (T = 150). The table displays the pairwise correlations between the first three 
principal components (in column) and some widely adopted global financial variables (in row; see, for instance, 
Longstaff et al., 2011). 
 
4.1.2 Estimation 
Before proceeding to the estimation of the model, I make sure that the logarithmic series of 
sovereign CDS spreads are stationary (similarly to Comelli, 2012; Poghosyan, 2014; Ho, 2016). 
Stationarity is an important condition in dynamic panel data models, especially if the time 
dimension of the sample T is larger than the cross-sectional dimension N. If this condition is 
not met, the OLS estimation may lead to spurious regressions (Baltagi, 2013, p. 251). Therefore, 
I check for unit roots in the panels by implementing two alternative tests: the Im-Pesaran-Shin 
test (2003) and a Fisher-type test based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Choi, 2001)18. I 
                                                          
17 Although high-yield spreads tend to comove with sovereign CDS spreads, I decided not to include these 
variables in the specification of the first model, as they display multicollinearity with stock returns especially. 
18 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test the null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots, against the alternative 
hypothesis that some panels are stationary. Under the null, the test statistics is asymptotically distributed as a 
N(0,1) for the cross-sectional dimension N → ∞ such that N/T = 0 (i.e. N is small enough compared to T). The 
Fisher-type test by Choi (2001) adopts the same null and alternative hypotheses of the Im-Pesaran-Shin test. Under 
the null, it is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with 2N degrees of freedom as T → ∞ for finite N. Both the tests 
allow for heterogeneous coefficients of the autoregressive terms under the alternative hypothesis, as both the test 
statistics combine information from separate Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the individual series. However, 
the Fisher-type test has the advantage that it can deal with unbalanced panel datasets with gaps in the individual 
time series. 
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demean the series to mitigate the effect of cross-sectional dependence; I also allow for a 
multiple lag structure, and a trend term or a drift term, alternatively. Both tests reject the null 
hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots at a 1% significance level. Hence, I assume that 
the series of sovereign CDS spreads are stationary and suitable for a dynamic fixed effects panel 
estimation. 
I report the estimates from different specifications in Table 4.5. As I detect the presence 
of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence in the dataset, I will 
correct each of these issues one at a time to show how the estimates are affected. Finally, I will 
provide an approach to deal with potential endogeneity issues. 
As a starter, in Column 1 I run a fixed effects panel estimation with the first lag of the 
dependent variable as the only predictor and an AR(1) disturbance in the error term. Modelling 
the error structure in order to account for first-order serial correlation is a recommended feature 
when the time dimension T is larger than the cross-sectional dimension N (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009, Chapter 8.10). The coefficient of the first lag is significant and large. This 
evidence is consistent across different specifications, thus confirming that the data generating 
process of sovereign CDS returns shows a strong persistence over time (Afonso et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the first lag alone explains a substantial fraction of the total variance in the data (as 
measured by the adjusted R2). 
In Column 2 I introduce the set of global variables. All the coefficients for which I 
previously formulated a hypothesis are statistically significant and with the expected sign. The 
coefficient of the variable accounting for the change in the effective federal funds rate is also 
statistically significant and turns out to have a negative sign. I interpret this finding in the sense 
that the U.S. yield curve signals the state of the U.S. economy and, consequently, of the world 
economy. As the Federal Reserve cuts the policy rate, the expectations on future 
macroeconomic prospects deteriorate, thus the sovereign CDS spreads of emerging countries 
rise. On the opposite, when the U.S. interest rates are climbing, they signal increasing 
confidence in future growth, thus the sovereign CDS spreads of emerging countries fall. 
In Column 3 I report the estimates on the full specification, i.e. resulting from adding 
the set of country-specific fundamentals to the specification in Column 2. Among the global 
factors, the change in the VIX index loses significance, but the other drivers remain strongly 
significant. Some country-specific variables are also significant and with the expected sign, 
namely industrial production, inflation, depreciation of the local currency, volatility of the local 
currency, domestic stocks returns and credit rating. However, the fraction of variance explained 
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by the model slightly decreases with respect to the specification in Column 2, suggesting that 
country-specific shocks as a whole may have a minor effect on the pricing of sovereign risk. 
Table 4.5: Regression of the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    FE FE FE FGLS FE LSDV 2SLS FE 
 Δ log CDS 0.927*** 0.930*** 0.922*** 0.967*** 0.937*** 0.926*** 0.936*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) 
 ΔVIX  0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001  0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
 Δ Fed funds  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**  -0.001*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
 Δ log S&P500  -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.014*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
 Δ log Industrial   -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002** -0.006 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
 Δ log Prices   0.017** 0.021*** 0.016** 0.013** 0.054** 
     (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.021) 
 Δ log T-o-T   -0.011 -0.013** -0.011* -0.016** 0.031 
     (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) 
 Δ log FX rate   0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.015* 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
 Δ log Curr. vol.   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Δ Reserves   -0.003 -0.005* -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
 Δ log Stocks   -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002 
     (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Δ Rating   -0.067*** -0.055** -0.062** -0.084*** 0.091 
     (0.026) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.184) 
 Constant 0.350*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.161*** 0.303*** 0.290*** 0.000 
   (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017) (0.048) (0.058) (0.000) 
 Obs. 2969 2814 2724 2743 2743 2743 2642 
 R2 0.873 0.897 0.894 . 0.927 0.950 0.918 
 Adjusted R2 0.873 0.896 0.892 . . . 0.917 
 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Country yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
 Time no no no no no yes no 
Note. Results from the regressions on a monthly panel dataset of N = 19 emerging countries between January 2007 
and July 2019 (average T per country = 144, minimum T = 122, maximum T = 150). The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads. All the country-specific continuous variables have been winsorised at a 
5% level (2.5% on each tail). Columns 1-3 report the estimates from a fixed effects panel regression with an AR(1) 
disturbance in the error term. The independent variables in Column 1 only include the first lag of the dependent 
variable; in Column 2 a set of global factors is added to the predictors specified in Column 1, while in Column 3 
I also add a set of country-specific shocks to the predictors in Column 2. In Column 4 I run a feasible generalised 
least squares (FGLS) estimation with a heteroscedastic AR(1) error structure. In Columns 5 and 6 I report the 
results from a fixed effects panel regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, accounting for heteroscedasticity, 
serial correlation of various forms and cross-sectional dependence. In Column 5 (baseline) I consider the same full 
specification of Column 3 and 4, while in Column 6 I replace the set of global shocks by a set of time dummies 
accounting for the month. In order to deal with potential endogeneity issues, in Column 7 I show the results from 
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a 2SLS fixed effects panel estimation with cross-section weights accounting for cross-section heteroscedasticity. 
The endogenous regressors are all the variables in the set of country-specific fundamentals and the instruments are 
their first to third lag (see Table 4.6 for additional test statistics on the estimation of which in Column 7). The p-
value in the bottom of the table is the result of a test of joint significance of the coefficients. I indicate whether the 
specification includes country and/or time fixed effects in the bottom of the table. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, 
respectively. 
 
In Column 4 I provide the estimates from a feasible GLS (FGLS) panel estimation. 
Compared to the fixed effects models of Columns 1-3, the FGLS estimator has the additional 
advantage of correcting heteroscedasticity across panels, but it does not allow for individual 
time-invariant effects19. All the significant variables in Column 3 are so also in Column 4. In 
addition, many other variables now gain statistical significance, both among the global factors 
(namely, the VIX index) and the country-specific factors (commodity terms-of-trade and 
official reserves). Furthermore, they have the expected sign. While accounting for 
heteroscedasticity did not deteriorate the significance of the estimates with respect to the 
previous estimation (as one would have expected), omitting individual time-invariant effects 
seems to cause more explanatory variables to capture heterogeneity across countries. 
Therefore, in Column 5 I return to a fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which constitutes my baseline specification. In addition to 
allowing for individual heterogeneity, this technique provides consistent estimates as it 
accounts at the same time for several forms of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2008). As expected, reintroducing individual fixed effects 
cause some variables to lose statistical significance. The global factors maintaining significance 
are the effective federal funds rate and the S&P500 returns (in line with the results from the 
PCA), while the country-specific factors are inflation, the commodity terms-of-trade, the 
depreciation of the local currency, the volatility of the local currency and the credit rating. 
As a robustness check, in Column 6 I report an alternative specification, wherein I 
replace global factors by dummy variables accounting for the month. Again, as in Column 6 I 
run a fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The test of joint significance of 
the time dummies (not reported) rejects the null hypothesis, thus validating the importance of 
the time dimension as previously captured by the global drivers. We can also observe some 
country-specific factors lose statistical significance, whereas other factors gain it. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
19 While the result of the Hausman test supports the adoption of a fixed effects model (p-value = 0.004), the 
estimates do not change much when a random effects model is implemented; furthermore, the use of a FGLS 
estimator is justified by the literature (Afonso et al., 2014, although they do not show the outcome). Thus, it makes 
sense to apply it in this study as well. 
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I am more interested in those variables maintaining significance across all the alternative full 
specifications from Column 3 to 6, because the corresponding estimates remain consistent 
regardless of the respective estimation technique. These are inflation, the depreciation of the 
local currency and the credit rating. 
Finally, I wish to explore more in detail the causal effect of country-specific 
fundamentals. Indeed, while it seems plausible that country-specific fundamentals drive the 
market pricing of sovereign risk, there exists a substantial possibility that sovereign CDS 
spreads affect the contemporaneous country-specific fundamentals too. As an example, let us 
consider a potential causal effect running from sovereign CDS spreads to the exchange rate. 
Hiking sovereign CDS returns may tilt the market expectations toward a default equilibrium; 
this would trigger capital outflows, which in turn would lead to a depreciation of the currency 
eventually. This feedback loop, called reverse causality, is likely to cause endogeneity of the 
predictors. In the presence of endogeneity, the standard OLS estimates can suffer from a severe 
bias. Therefore, in order to deal with potential endogeneity issues, I perform a 2SLS fixed 
effects estimation as in Afonso et al. (2014), wherein I use the first to the third lag of country-
specific drivers as instruments for the endogenous regressors. I also employ cross-section 
weights accounting for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Before analysing the results for the 
single estimates, let us have a look at some test statistics assessing the overall adequacy of the 
IV approach (Table 4.6). The underidentification test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
instruments have insufficient explanatory power to predict the endogenous variables. 
Moreover, the Sargan test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the over-
identifying restrictions. Thus, the instruments appear to be relevant and valid, respectively.20 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogenous 
regressors in the structural equation. Therefore, while still showing the results from the IV 
approach as a robustness check, I find no empirical evidence that the OLS estimates suffer from 
endogeneity. 
Table 4.6: Test statistics on the IV estimation. 
Name of the test H0 Statistic P-value 
Anderson canonical correlations test The instruments are not relevant χ²(17) = 42.38 0.001 
Sargan test The overidentifying restrictions are valid χ²(16) = 22.35 0.132 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test The regressors suspected of endogeneity 
are actually exogenous 
χ²(8) = 6.64 0.576 
                                                          
20 A severe bias may arise from the use of weak instruments in the first stage regression (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
Thus, I perform several tests (not reported) and find some evidence that my instruments are not weak. 
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Note. This table shows the results from the Anderson canonical correlation test (or underidentification test), the 
Sargan test (or overidentification test) and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (or augmented regression test for 
endogeneity) on the IV model reported in Column 7 of Table 4.5. 
Indeed, the results of the 2SLS fixed effects estimation, reported in Column 7 of Table 
4.5, indicate that most of the previous conclusions still hold when accounting for endogeneity. 
Specifically, they confirm the persistence of sovereign CDS returns over time, as well as the 
importance of the U.S. yield curve and the U.S. stock market. The bulk of the country-specific 
factors is also confirmed, in the sense that both inflation and the depreciation of the local 
currency are still significant – albeit the latter not as strongly as in the previous specifications. 
All the signs are unchanged and the magnitude of most of the significant coefficients remain in 
line with the previous results (except inflation, which becomes four times larger). A striking 
difference is in the estimates of the credit rating, which in this case does not appear to be 
significant. Oddly, it seems that rating changes do not have any exogenous impact on sovereign 
CDS spreads but rather they are endogenously determined. These findings are somehow 
consistent with Afonso et al. (2012), which document a two-way causality between the two 
variables in the short run (based on a panel dataset of 24 European countries in the period 1995-
2010). In addition to the traditional causal effect running from the ratings to the sovereign CDS 
spreads, they show that price movements tend to anticipate rating adjustments in the same 
direction by 1-2 weeks (i.e. inverse causal effect). My results indicate that the causal 
relationship between ratings and sovereign CDS spreads is likely to be more complex than in 
the usual sense. While keeping this caveat in mind, I will not explore this issue further, as 
disentangling the direction of causality between the two is beyond the purpose of this thesis. 
Furthermore, as I have shown above, endogeneity does not seem to constitute a major issue in 
my model. 
Summing up, I conclude that sovereign CDS returns exhibit a strong persistence over 
time. They are also significantly and negatively affected by global shocks (notably, the U.S. 
stock returns and the effective federal funds rate). Within the group of country-specific changes, 
inflation and the depreciation rate of the local currency are the most significant and positive 
predictors. The comprehensive measure of credit rating is significant as well and affects 
sovereign CDS returns in a negative sense. However, the causal linkage between these two 
variables seems to be more difficult to establish. 
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4.1.3 Sensitivity analysis 
As in the descriptive analysis I documented sizeable time and regional differences in sovereign 
CDS spreads, in this subsection I assess the extent to which the estimates change when allowing 
for structural breaks over time and across regions, respectively. Specifically, in the analysis 
over time (Table 4.7), I consider the possibility of differential effects of each variable during 
the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. In the regional analysis (Table 
4.8), I estimate the baseline model on three regions separately (Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and Pacific, respectively). 
The sensitivity analysis over time follows the econometric approach of Afonso et al., 
2014, which accounts for different periods by the use of interaction variables (although the 
research question in their study focuses on the effect of fiscal fundamentals on European 
spreads). In Column 1 of Table 4.7 I report the results from the estimation on the baseline 
specification (the same as in Column 5 of Table 4.5), whereas in Column 2 I show the results 
from a modified version of the baseline regression, which includes a dummy variable 
accounting for the global financial crisis. I assign a value equal to 1 if the observation belongs 
to the period from August 2007 (when financial tensions in the markets began to rise) to March 
2009 (also adopted as ending date of the financial crisis by Afonso et al., 2014), and 0 otherwise. 
This dummy enters the specification both alone and in a set of interaction terms with all the 
other variables. I observe notable differentials in the impact of some global factors. Specifically, 
while in general changes in the VIX index do not appear to affect sovereign CDS spreads, 
during the global financial crisis the influence of market volatility is significant and positive. 
This means that the volatility in the stock market matters less to investors in tranquil times, but 
becomes more important in period of financial turmoil. Furthermore, while the U.S. yield curve 
exerts a negative effect on CDS spreads in general, during the crisis its effect is countered by 
one of the same magnitude, but opposite direction. This indicates that, in line with my previous 
interpretation from the estimation of the baseline model, U.S. interest rates are more informative 
in tranquil times, as they are free to fluctuate towards the market equilibrium. In periods of 
systemic distress, though, the information content of the yield curve is substantially reduced, as 
interest rates are artificially managed and restrained at low levels in order to stimulate credit, 
investment, and production. This evidence corroborates the findings by Comelli (2012), who 
reports a significant negative effect of short-term U.S. interest rates only before the global 
financial crisis.  
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Table 4.7. Sensitivity analysis of the regression of sovereign CDS spreads over time. 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
       FE    FE    FE 
 Δ log CDS 0.937*** 0.928*** 0.916*** 
   (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
 Δ log CDS × Financial crisis  0.009 0.011 
    (0.007) (0.008) 
 Δ log CDS × Sovereign debt crisis   0.005* 
     (0.003) 
 Δ VIX 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Δ VIX × Financial crisis  0.006** 0.007*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
 Δ VIX × Sovereign debt crisis   0.007** 
     (0.003) 
 Δ Fed funds -0.001** -0.003*** -0.002** 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Δ Fed funds × Financial crisis  0.003*** 0.002** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
 Δ Fed funds × Sovereign debt crisis   0.002 
     (0.003) 
 Δ log S&P500 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 Δ log S&P500 × Financial crisis  -0.006 -0.004 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
 Δ log S&P500 × Sovereign debt crisis   0.013*** 
     (0.004) 
 Δ log Industrial -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Δ log Industrial × Financial crisis  -0.003 -0.003 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
 Δ log Industrial × Sovereign debt crisis   0.001 
     (0.003) 
 Δ log Prices 0.016** 0.021*** 0.019** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Δ log Prices × Financial crisis  -0.024 -0.025 
    (0.030) (0.030) 
 Δ log Prices × Sovereign debt crisis   -0.020 
     (0.016) 
 Δ log Terms-of-trade -0.011* -0.017*** -0.013* 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
 Δ log Terms-of-trade × Financial crisis  0.019 0.016 
    (0.016) (0.017) 
 Δ log Terms-of-trade × Sovereign debt crisis   -0.016 
     (0.033) 
 Δ log Exchange rate 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Δ log Exchange rate × Financial crisis  -0.011* -0.012** 
    (0.006) (0.006) 
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      (1)   (2)   (3) 
       FE    FE    FE 
 Δ log Exchange rate × Sovereign debt crisis   -0.004 
     (0.004) 
 Δ log Currency volatility 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Δ log Currency volatility × Financial crisis  0.001*** 0.001*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
 Δ log Currency volatility × Sovereign debt crisis   -0.000 
     (0.000) 
 Δ Reserves -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
 Δ Reserves × Financial crisis  0.007 0.008 
    (0.013) (0.013) 
 Δ Reserves × Sovereign debt crisis   0.019 
     (0.011) 
 Δ log Stocks -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Δ log Stocks × Financial crisis  0.001 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
 Δ log Stocks × Sovereign debt crisis   0.001 
     (0.002) 
 Δ Rating -0.062** -0.053** -0.047* 
   (0.031) (0.024) (0.028) 
 Δ Rating × Financial crisis  -0.051 -0.068 
    (0.118) (0.120) 
 Δ Rating × Sovereign debt crisis   -0.062 
     (0.051) 
 Financial crisis  -0.033 -0.033 
    (0.046) (0.049) 
 Sovereign debt crisis   0.015 
     (0.012) 
 Constant 0.303*** 0.349*** 0.400*** 
   (0.048) (0.062) (0.064) 
 Observations 2743 2743 2743 
 Pseudo R2 0.927 0.930 0.932 
 Adjusted R2 . . . 
 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Country yes yes yes 
 Time no no no 
 
Note. Results from the regressions on a monthly panel dataset of N = 19 emerging countries from January 2007 to 
July 2019 (average T per country = 144, minimum T = 122, maximum T = 150). The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads. All the country-specific continuous variables have been winsorised at a 5% 
level (2.5% on each tail). In Column 1 I report the results from the estimation of a fixed effects model on the full 
sample period. In Column 2 I add to the specification in Column 1 the interaction terms of each variable with a 
dummy equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the global financial crisis period from August 2007 to March 2009, 
and 0 otherwise. In Column 3 I add to the specification in Column 2 the interaction terms of each variable with a 
dummy equal to 1 if the observation refers to a country belonging to the regions of Europe and Central Asia or 
Middle East and North Africa in the period from April 2009 to July 2012, and 0 otherwise. The p-value in the 
bottom of the table is the result of a test of joint significance of the coefficients. I indicate whether the specification 
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includes country and/or time fixed effects in the bottom of the table. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate that the 
coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
Within the set of country-specific fundamentals, all the significant variables in the 
baseline specification (namely inflation, changes in the terms-of-trade, currency depreciation, 
changes in the currency volatility and changes in the credit rating) remain significant when 
considering the interactions with the crisis dummy; in addition, the variable accounting for 
domestic stocks returns becomes significant. I witness some crisis-specific effects of the 
variables related to the local currency only. The effect of the depreciation of the local currency 
is nullified, in the crisis period, by an opposite effect of approximately equal size; the influence 
of the volatility of the currency, instead, increases during the crisis. I interpret the former in the 
light of the diminished importance of external factors as determinants of sovereign spreads in 
the aftermath of the crisis (in favour of fiscal factors instead, according to Aizenman et al., 
2016). On the other hand, the latter is in line with an enhanced role of market volatility in 
periods of financial distress (analogous to the evidence on the VIX index). 
In Column 3 I add to the specification reported in Column 2 the interaction of each 
explanatory variable with a dummy equal to 1 if the variable is observed in one of the two 
regions of Europe and Central Asia, or the Middle East and North Africa, respectively, at the 
time of the European sovereign debt crisis, and 0 otherwise. The choice of the two regions 
comes from the outcome of the principal component analysis in Section 4.1.1, indicating a high 
degree of commonality between the European spreads (e.g. Poland, Romania) and the Israeli 
spread (the only country within the Middle East and North Africa group in the first model), 
especially in the sovereign debt crisis period. The time interval under consideration starts in 
April 2009 (implying that the global financial crisis immediately turns into the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe, as in Afonso et al., 2014) and ends in July 2012, when the “whatever it takes” 
speech by the ECB President took place21. The persistency of the spreads slightly increases in 
the selected regions in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, but the coefficient is barely 
significant. The most noticeable differences concern the set of global factors. The effect of the 
VIX index is significant and positive in these regions in the sovereign debt distress period, just 
like in the global financial crisis period. In fact, the magnitude of the coefficients related to its 
                                                          
21 “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be 
enough” (ECB, 2012). With these words, on 26 July 2012 the then President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, announced 
the full commitment of the ECB to alleviate tensions in the sovereign bond markets by extending and enlarging 
the newly introduced quantitative easing program, if necessary. Later, many analysts have considered this choice 
of words as a turning point towards the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe (Brunnermeier, 2018). 
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interactions with the two dummies (the one accounting for the global financial crisis and the 
other for the European debt crisis) is the same. The evidence on the enhanced role of the VIX 
index in turbulent times (in line with the findings of Afonso et al., 2014) hints at some signs of 
continuity in the investors’ risk attitudes in Europe between the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent sovereign debt distress period. However, there are also tentative signs of 
discontinuity when compared to the global financial crisis. On the one hand, the negative risk 
transmission channel with the U.S. interest rates was re-established as in tranquil times, thus 
restoring the signalling effect of the yield curve. On the other hand, the negative effect of the 
S&P500 returns on European spreads diminished considerably with respect to both the global 
financial crisis and more tranquil times, as the interaction term generates an opposite positive 
effect, almost equal in size. One should bear in mind that the U.S. stock market experienced a 
remarkable jump after the end of the financial crisis (Figure 3.4). This means that the borrowing 
costs of European sovereign issuers did not benefit from international spillovers from the global 
equity market as much as they would have done in normal times. When analysing the set of 
country-specific fundamentals, I do not witness any significant differential impact on sovereign 
CDS spreads compared to tranquil times. 
In Table 4.8 I display the results from running the baseline regression on each region 
separately. The approach adopted in this regional analysis is in the spirit of the studies by 
Comelli (2012) and Aizenman et al. (2016) on monthly and quarterly data, respectively, but 
includes a partially different set of explanatory variables. I only consider three regions out of 
the five listed in Table 3.1: Europe and Central Asia (“Europe”), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (“Latin America”) and East Asia and Pacific (“Asia”). In Column 1 I estimate the 
model on the full sample (as in Column 5 of Table 4.5), while in Columns 2, 3 and 4 on 
European, Latin American and Asian countries only, respectively. I confirm that, in general, 
sovereign CDS spreads in Europe tend to be more persistent than in the other two regions. 
Among the global variables, both the negative sign and the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
U.S. interest rates stay constant across regions, but its statistical significance varies, being very 
significant for Europe, barely significant for Asia, and not significant for Latin America, 
respectively. The S&P500 returns, instead, are significant for all the regions, but the size of the 
negative coefficient varies across regions, being more than double for Latin America and Asia 
than for Europe. This indicates that the pricing of the sovereign risk of European issuers 
depends more on the U.S. yield curve, while the sovereign risk premia of Latin American and 
Asian issuers are more affected by the U.S. stock market (in line with the previous evidence 
suggested by the PCA, Section 4.1.1). I interpret these differences in the sense that the 
synchronisation between European sovereign spreads and the world economy mainly occurs 
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through the financial cycle (as captured by changes in the U.S. yield curve), whereas in the case 
of Latin American and Asian spreads it prevalently works through the business cycle (as 
proxied by the S&P500 returns). These results differ from those reported by Comelli (2012), 
who finds the VIX index positively affects spreads in all the regions, while the short-term U.S. 
interest rates do not have any influence. However, in their analysis, these variables enter the 
regression in a logarithmic form and their sample considers a different period, so their results 
are not fully comparable. 
Within the set of country-specific fundamentals, the most relevant variables are those 
referring to the stability of the value of the local currency. Specifically, a depreciation of the 
local currency has a larger (positive) effect for Latin America and Asia than for Europe, 
possibly because of the history of exchange rate crises in the first two regions. The volatility of 
the local currency is also significant in each of the three regions, although its magnitude is 
negligible. On the other hand, changes in the commodity terms-of-trade and domestic stocks 
returns are significant in Europe only. The constant terms for Latin American and Asian spreads 
indicate that sovereign issuers in these regions pay a fixed (i.e. time-invariant) premium, which 
is larger than the one paid by European issuers (consistent with Comelli, 2012). 
Summing up, the analysis allowing for time-varying coefficients reveals that the effect 
of some factors on sovereign CDS spreads changes in periods of distress. Specifically, during 
the global financial crisis, the negative transmission mechanism with the U.S. yield curve was 
interrupted, whereas market volatility (as measured by the VIX index) started playing a greater 
role. The heightened role of uncertainty concerned the volatility of the local currency too, which 
became significant in the crisis period, while its depreciation rate became less important. In the 
European sovereign debt crisis, the negative link with the U.S. interest rates was restored. In 
addition, the influence of U.S. stock returns on European spreads was weaker than in tranquil 
times, but the volatility of the U.S. stock market continued to exert a positive effect on European 
spreads as during the global financial crisis. On the other hand, the regional analysis highlights 
that European spreads are more affected by the U.S. interest rates, whereas Latin American and 
Asian spreads depend more heavily on U.S. equity returns. The variables accounting for the 
stability of the local currency are relevant for all the regions, whereby other macroeconomic 
fundamentals (such as the change in the commodity terms-of-trade and domestic stock returns) 
are significant for Europe only. Finally, spreads in Europe tend to be more persistent over time, 
while in Latin America and Asia the borrowing costs are shifted upwards by a larger time-
invariant risk premium. 
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Table 4.8: Sensitivity analysis of the regression of sovereign CDS spreads across regions. 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       All    Europe    Latin America    Asia 
 Δ log CDS 0.937*** 0.948*** 0.932*** 0.932*** 
   (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) 
 ΔVIX 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Δ Fed funds -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 Δ log S&P500 -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Δ log Industrial -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Δ log Prices 0.016** 0.006 0.012 0.016 
   (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
 Δ log Terms-of-trade -0.011* -0.021* 0.015 -0.006 
   (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
 Δ log Exchange rate 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
 Δ log Currency volatility 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Δ Reserves -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
   (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Δ log Stocks -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
 Δ Rating -0.062** -0.029 -0.051 -0.076 
   (0.031) (0.039) (0.042) (0.065) 
 Constant 0.303*** 0.256*** 0.328*** 0.321*** 
   (0.048) (0.053) (0.073) (0.057) 
 Observations 2743 869 728 855 
 Pseudo R2 0.927 0.945 0.920 0.928 
 Adjusted R2 . . . . 
 P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Country yes yes yes yes 
 Time no no no no 
 
Note. Results from the regressions on a monthly panel dataset of N = 19 emerging countries from January 2007 to 
July 2019 (average T per country = 144, minimum T = 122, maximum T = 150). The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads. All the country-specific continuous variables have been winsorised at a 5% 
level (2.5% on each tail). In Column 1 I report the results from the estimation of a fixed effects model on the full 
sample of countries. In Column 2, 3 and 4, I apply the same model to separate regressions on three regional groups 
of countries, namely Europe, Latin America and Asia, respectively. The p-value at the bottom of the table is the 
result of a test of joint significance of the coefficients. I indicate whether the specification includes country and/or 
time fixed effects in the bottom of the table. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, serial 
correlation and cross-sectional dependence are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are 
significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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4.2 Determinants of sovereign defaults 
4.2.1 Estimation 
In Table 4.9 I report the results of the estimation of the second model by a binary logistic 
regression. The standard errors are clustered at a country level to correct for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation (Petersen, 2009). I add each group of predictors one at a time in order to 
compare the estimates from alternative specifications. 
In Column 1 I regress the dependent variable on global factors only. The VIX index 
only is significant and carries the expected sign. However, the coefficients are not jointly 
significant at a 5% level and the R2 is very low. Hence, I derive global factors do not seem to 
have any substantial effect on the default probability of the sovereign (see also Jeanneret and 
Souissi, 2016). Along with the evidence from the first model, these results suggest that global 
variables affect the risk premium component of sovereign spreads, but not the default risk of a 
country (Remolona et al. 2008). 
In Column 2 I add to the previous specification a set of country-specific domestic 
variables. Interestingly, almost all of them are significant and most of them have the expected 
sign. A notable exception, not even reaching a statistical significance of 10%, is inflation. Given 
that it is one of the few significant country-specific predictors of sovereign CDS returns in the 
first model, its irrelevance here may seem at odds with the previous results. However, its lack 
of significance matches the results provided by Jeanneret and Souissi (2016), who show 
inflation only impinges on the probability of default on local currency debt, as debt 
monetisation does not apply to foreign currency debt. Therefore, inflation seems to affect the 
risk premium component (as international investors attach a value to the financial stability and 
government credibility signals inferable from the level of inflation), but not the foreign currency 
default risk. 
I also include some country-specific external factors in Column 3 but, strikingly, none 
of them appears to be significant. I will come back to some of these partial results in the light 
of the full specification. 
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Table 4.9: Determinants of the probability of a sovereign issuer being in external default. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    Global Domestic FX Default  
history 
RE Original sin 
 VIX 0.024** -0.055 -0.041 -0.041 -0.024 -0.085* 
   (0.012) (0.039) (0.043) (0.056) (0.064) (0.045) 
 Fed funds 0.048 -0.328*** -0.359*** -0.299 -0.177 -0.328** 
   (0.056) (0.119) (0.131) (0.183) (0.187) (0.130) 
 Financial crisis -0.264 2.017* 2.265** 2.603** 2.769* 3.427*** 
   (0.340) (1.030) (0.980) (1.216) (1.433) (1.249) 
 Population  -0.812** -0.820* -0.649* -1.062 -0.572 
    (0.362) (0.426) (0.341) (0.669) (0.461) 
 Δ log GDP  -0.214** -0.189 -0.182 -0.180 -0.099 
    (0.102) (0.121) (0.128) (0.131) (0.147) 
 Δ log Prices  -0.033 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 -0.080 
    (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.055) 
 Credit  -0.079*** -0.075** -0.070*** -0.139*** -0.092*** 
    (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.050) (0.017) 
 Public debt  0.044*** 0.044*** 0.036** 0.040* 0.026** 
    (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.013) 
 Budget balance  0.182** 0.218** 0.168 0.068 0.174 
    (0.081) (0.098) (0.109) (0.117) (0.122) 
 Resource rich  -2.223*** -1.979** -1.442* -2.542 -1.470* 
    (0.860) (0.842) (0.828) (1.665) (0.788) 
 Banking crisis  1.730** 1.576** 1.718*** 1.662*** 1.919*** 
    (0.704) (0.673) (0.536) (0.575) (0.559) 
 Domestic default  2.918*** 3.241*** 2.468*** 2.692*** 3.296*** 
    (0.800) (0.866) (0.662) (0.915) (0.689) 
 ESG  -0.279*** -0.296*** -0.271*** -0.357** -0.274*** 
    (0.067) (0.078) (0.053) (0.140) (0.086) 
 Current account   0.020 0.055 0.116 0.013 
     (0.067) (0.063) (0.104) (0.066) 
 Δ log Terms-of-trade   -0.070 -0.079* -0.069* -0.097 
     (0.043) (0.047) (0.041) (0.066) 
 Terms-of-trade volatility   -0.240 -0.291 -0.320 -0.357 
     (0.177) (0.219) (0.225) (0.225) 
 Currency crisis   -0.243 0.123 0.054  
     (0.679) (0.666) (0.889)  
 Last default    0.039*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 
      (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
 Regional defaults    0.095 0.021 0.032 
      (0.125) (0.161) (0.155) 
 Δ log Exchange rate      0.098** 
        (0.041) 
 Reserves      0.112 
        (0.102) 
 Foreign currency debt      0.019 
        (0.105) 
 Short-term debt      -0.019 
        (0.034) 
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    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    Global Domestic FX Default  
history 
RE Original sin 
 Constant -2.493*** 16.502*** 16.976*** 12.018*** 18.846** 11.696 
   (0.531) (3.570) (3.737) (2.569) (7.451) (8.698) 
 No. observations 712 712 712 712 712 576 
 No. countries 43 43 43 43 43 35 
 No. defaults 94 94 94 94 94 50 
 Pseudo R2  0.004 0.676 0.684 0.748 . 0.677 
 P-value 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Log-likelihood -276.620 -90.087 -87.900 -70.062 -67.038 -54.928 
Note. Results from the regressions on a yearly panel dataset of N = 43 emerging countries between 1996 and 2014 
(average T per country = 16, minimum T = 3, maximum T = 19). The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the country is in external sovereign default to private creditors in the following year. Columns 1-4 
report the estimates from a binary logistic regression. In Column 1 I include only the set of global variables. In 
Column 2 I add some domestic country-specific fundamentals. In Column 3 I add some foreign country-specific 
fundamentals. In Column 4 (baseline) I add to the predictors the history of external sovereign defaults of the 
country. In Column 5 I run a random effects logistic regression on the full specification of Column 4. Finally, in 
Column 6 I add some variables accounting for the original sin hypothesis and replace the dummy for currency 
crises by another variable measuring the depreciation rate of the local currency. All the country-specific continuous 
variables have been winsorised at a 5% level (2.5% on each tail). Robust standard errors clustered at a country 
level are in parentheses. The p-value is the result of a test of joint significance of the coefficients. ***, **, * 
indicate that the coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
In Column 4 (baseline) I add to the previous specification two variables related to past 
external defaults of the sovereign issuer and other sovereign issuers from the same region, 
respectively. I find the history of defaults does matter, as countries who were in default in the 
past are more likely to be in default also in the future. However, a similar statement does not 
hold for what concerns regional sovereign defaults, as they do not seem to push other countries 
in the same region to default. 
As I am now discussing the baseline case, we can spot the most relevant predictors by 
comparing the estimates across the different specifications analysed so far (Columns 1-4). 
Among the global variables, only the dummy for the 2007-2008 financial crisis reaches some 
statistical significance, thus confirming my previous interpretation of the overall scarce 
significance of global factors as structural drivers of defaults. Among the country-specific 
factors, the domestic factors especially seem to contribute in predicting sovereign defaults: 
almost all of them (except inflation and the overall budget balance, which loses significance in 
our baseline specification) are significant and with the expected sign. Within the group of 
external country-specific factors, from the baseline specification, only the change in the 
commodity terms-of-trade seems to exert some negative effect on the probability of default (in 
line with the findings in Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010). Surprisingly, the occurrence of a 
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currency crisis does not seem to affect the probability of external default of the sovereign issuer. 
I will address this issue in detail when discussing the results from Column 6. 
In Column 5 I adopt the same set of explanatory variables as in Column 4, but I run a 
panel logistic regression with random effects.22 The only difference in the estimates is the 
complete loss of statistical significance of the dummy accounting for natural resource-rich 
countries, but the signs of all the significant predictors do not change. The adjusted Wald test 
of joint significance of the coefficients (reported at the bottom of Column 5) rejects the null 
hypothesis of nil panel-level variance, suggesting the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, there is a caveat. The random effects logit model relies on the assumption that 
the underlying shocks have no serial correlation, which is a very strong assumption. On the 
other hand, the model has no known robustness properties to serial correlation; therefore, in 
general, the resulting estimates are likely to be inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2010, Section 15.8.3). 
Hence, while providing the results from this specification as a robustness check, I decide to 
disregard the time dimension of the data and proceed with a pooled logit estimation with 
clustered standard errors throughout the remaining analysis. 
In Column 6 I provide the results from a different specification that includes a few more 
variables accounting for the original sin hypothesis (see Section 1.2.1). Specifically, the 
variables directly linked to this hypothesis are the fraction of foreign currency debt over total 
external public debt (accounting for currency mismatches) and the fraction of short-term debt 
over total external debt (accounting for maturity mismatches). I also consider the level of 
international reserves, as Hofmann et al. (2019) claim an adequate level of reserves to be one 
of the main policy tools against the amplification of external shocks arising from mismatches 
in the debt composition. Finally, in order to capture the magnitude of external shocks, I drop 
the dummy for currency crises (which did not seem to have any significance in all the previous 
specifications) and replace it with the change in the nominal bilateral exchange rate (wherein a 
positive change indicates a depreciation of the local currency). 
Although the qualitative indicator for currency crises did not exert any material effect, 
the quantitative variable for the change in the nominal exchange rate now gains statistical 
significance: the amount of depreciation has a positive impact on the probability of default. 
Therefore, I claim that, while in general a depreciation of the local currency does increase the 
                                                          
22 As from the Stata manual, “the random-effects model is calculated using quadrature, which is an approximation 
whose accuracy depends partially on the number of integration points used” (StataCorp, 2015). When the estimates 
are largely affected by the choice on the number of integration points, they cannot be interpreted reliably. This is 
not the case in the current study, so I can safely make statistical inference. 
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probability of default, the occurrence of an extreme currency event does not seem to exert 
additional upward pressure per se. Moreover, I do not find any evidence that the debt structure, 
both in terms of currency and maturity composition, has any effect whatsoever on the 
probability of default. Similarly to the first model, the level of reserves does not seem to have 
any significant impact as well (analogous results are found by Jeanneret and Souissi, 2016). 
This lack of evidence suggests that while the Eichengreen and Mody (1998) original sin 
hypothesis may have vanished because of the improved balancing in the currency and maturity 
composition of sovereign debt (Burger et al., 2012), the consequential original sin redux 
hypothesis proposed by Carstens and Shin (2019) may be yet to come, at least in this 1996-
2014 dataset.  
Overall, by focusing on those variables that retain statistical significance in each of the 
full specifications (Columns 4-6), I conclude that country-specific factors play an important 
role in predicting external sovereign defaults in emerging countries. Domestic fundamentals 
especially tend to exert a significant impact. Financial soundness of both public and private 
balance sheets (as captured by the levels of general government debt, domestic bank credit to 
the private sector and the nexus between domestic sovereign defaults and banking crises) is of 
primary relevance, but also extra-financial performances (as measured by our composite ESG 
indicator) matter for debt sustainability purposes. On the internal side, domestic defaults tend 
to anticipate external defaults. On the external side, the history of past defaults to international 
investors help predict future defaults; its effect is larger as the last default is closer in time, but 
it rapidly decays after a few years. Other external factors, such as the depreciation rate of the 
currency or changes in the commodity terms-of-trade (and especially those factors accounting 
for the original sin hypothesis), appear as somehow less relevant. Finally, global factors seem 
to have a minor effect. Nevertheless, I detect an upwards shift in sovereign risk in the period of 
the global financial crisis. 
 
4.2.2 Classification 
After estimating the logistic regression model, I evaluate its properties as a binary classifier.23 
Indeed, the occurrence of a sovereign external default in country i in year t+1 can be interpreted 
                                                          
23 Classification is a supervised learning technique used for predicting a dependent categorical variable based on 
a set of independent variables. It starts by splitting a dataset in two parts, one called training set and the other test 
set. On the training set, the analyst builds a model that identifies the effect of each predictor on the outcome 
variable. The model is then applied to the test set in order to predict the outcomes of this new sample. Finally, the 
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as an early warning signal issued in year t. Therefore, it is natural to think of the model as a 
valuable tool for investors to distinguish between “safer” and “riskier” sovereign bonds. In 
order to do so, I split the full sample into two subsamples, one for training the model (training 
set) and the other for testing it on the remaining data (test set). As a robustness check, I propose 
three alternative separations into training and test set according to different time breaks. For 
training purposes, I adopt the baseline specification in Column 4 of Table 4.9.24  
In Table 4.10. I report the contingency matrices from the classification on alternative 
sample periods. In Panel A I train the model on the period 1996-2008, in Panel B on the period 
1996-2010 and in Panel C on the period 1996-2012. I always assume a probability cutoff of 
0.50, so that the classification is based on the mathematical expectation of default.25 
Table 4.10: Contingency matrices from different classifications based on alternative training sets. 
Panel A: Training 1996-2008, testing 2009-2014. 
 No crisis Crisis Total 
No signal 230 1 231 
Signal 0 23 23 
Total 230 24 254 
Panel B: Training 1996-2010, testing 2011-2014. 
 No crisis Crisis Total 
No signal 155 1 156 
Signal 0 13 13 
Total 155 14 169 
Panel C: Training 1996-2012, testing 2013-2014 
 No crisis Crisis Total 
No signal 77 1 78 
Signal 0 6 6 
Total 77 7 84 
 
                                                          
predicted outcomes are compared with the actual outcomes to assess the performances of the classifier. See 
Holopainen and Sarlin (2017) for a review of various classification methods as early-warning models. 
24 For classification purposes, the specification in Column 4 was preferred to the one in Column 6 because of the 
number of defaults in the respective datasets, almost double in the former than in the latter. The classification 
properties of the estimator considerably improve by providing more information on historical defaults. 
25 Global investors may prefer giving up on potentially attractive investment opportunities in order to prevent any 
default to harm their portfolios (i.e. in statistical terms, increasing sensitivity at the expense of specificity). It is 
certainly possible to tweak the probability cutoff to a lower value (e.g. 0.01): the sensitivity of the classifier then 
reaches 100% (i.e. all the upcoming defaults are correctly predicted), but its specificity falls to around 86%. To a 
large extent, the choice on the parameters is subjective and depends on the loss function of the individual investor. 
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I will now assess the performances of the model in terms of three popular measures: 
accuracy (i.e. the fraction of correctly predicted outcomes over total predicted outcomes); 
specificity (i.e. the fraction of correctly predicted negative outcomes over total predicted 
negative outcomes); and sensitivity (i.e. the fraction of correctly predicted positive outcome 
over total predicted positive outcomes). In all the subsample periods, the overall accuracy is 
very high (approximately around 99%). In terms of specificity, the model achieves excellent 
performances, in the sense that no sound investment opportunity is forgone (100%). In terms 
of sensitivity, the classifier correctly predicts almost all the sovereign defaults occurring in the 
next year (96%, 93% and 86% in Panels A, B and C, respectively). However, considering that 
all the panels report one false negative (i.e. a crisis occurred but no signal was issued), it is 
worth spending some words on this seemingly systematic error. This missed call always refers 
to the same observation, namely the 2014 Argentine default. While this default has its roots in 
the long history of financial crises in Argentina, it has some peculiar features that make it rather 
different, for instance, to the 2001 Argentine crisis. In the 2001 context, the Argentine economy 
was collapsing at a rapid pace and default was widely expected by the market because of the 
government inability-to-pay. Conversely, while in 2014 the health conditions of the economic 
system had substantially improved compared to the 2001 crisis, the default arose from a 
political decision of the Argentine government not to negotiate with a minority of creditors, 
thus showing a clear unwillingness-to-pay. However, as international markets believed the 
economic costs of a default would have been higher than the political cost of negotiation, many 
market analysts did not expect the default to occur and, in the prior years, the economic 
fundamentals of Argentina did not suffer from any deterioration of the sovereign’s credit quality 
(Vuletin, 2014).26 Although the classifier probably needs to capture political risk factors more 
effectively, a decision to default not previously discounted by the markets can be considered to 
a large extent as exogenous to the model. Therefore, I decided to treat this case as an outlier 
and neglect the related systematic classification bias. 
                                                          
26 The “selective” default sprang from a 2014 U.S. court ruling in favour of some holdout investors who had been 
claiming for full repayment of their credit. The holdout investors were a minority of Argentine bondholders (2% 
of the investor base, owning around 7% of the sovereign debt of the country), mostly composed by hedge funds 
and vulture funds. They had been refusing to accept the haircuts proposed by the Argentine government and 
accepted by the vast majority of its creditors (98%). While the full repayment of the holdout creditors alone was 
likely to be sustainable from a public finance perspective, it would have triggered a “rights upon future offers” 
(RUFO) clause that obliged the government to pay in full also those creditors who had previously accepted the 
haircuts. Since the RUFO clause was expiring at the end of the year, many analysts expected the government to 
negotiate with the holdout creditors for a one-year stay. Indeed, international markets considered this as a “win-
win” outcome: the government would have offered adequate guarantees to the holdout creditors while preventing 
the triggering of the RUFO clause. However, the government deemed this political compromise too high a price 





The sovereign debt of emerging countries has attracted growing interest among international 
investors over the last decade as these economies progressively managed to shield against 
adverse macroeconomic shocks. This major improvement raised questions among academics 
about the causes of this paradigm shift and the true nature of sovereign credit risk in emerging 
countries. Specifically, some authors in the literature investigated the drivers of the default risk 
embedded in sovereign debt, while other authors focused on the determinants of the pricing of 
that specific risk. This thesis addresses both the issues from the perspective of an international 
investor and by the adoption of an empirical approach, which includes two distinct models. In 
the first model, I regress sovereign CDS spreads on their first lag, some global factors and some 
country-specific fundamentals; I estimate the equation by fixed effects panel OLS. I also run a 
PCA in order to quantify the commonalities across spreads over time. In the second model, I 
estimate the probability of default of each country in the following year by a binary logistic 
regression based on an extensive set of global and country-specific leading indicators. Then, I 
train the model on a subsample and test its classification properties on the remaining sample. 
In the first model, I show that sovereign CDS spreads are largely persistent over time 
(as in Afonso et al., 2014). Global risk factors, especially the U.S. stock market and the U.S. 
yield curve, are robust and negative determinants of sovereign borrowing costs. Indeed, the 
results of the PCA point out that spreads exhibit a high degree of cointegration. Nevertheless, 
some country-specific fundamentals, namely inflation and the depreciation rate of the local 
currency, are also relevant and have a positive effect. These results closely relate to the evidence 
provided by Longstaff et al. (2011). Credit ratings appear to have a significant negative effect 
(consistent with the seminal paper by Cantor and Packer, 1996). However, I suspect potential 
simultaneity with spreads, in line with more recent analyses investigating the Granger causality 
between spreads and ratings (Afonso et al., 2012). The influence of all these variables, though, 
depends on both the period and the region under consideration. Concerning shifts over time, 
the U.S. interest rates ceased to exert any effect in the wake of the global financial crisis, while 
the positive role of market volatility significantly increased in the same period. Among country-
specific fundamentals, the volatility in the value of the local currency became more important, 
whereas its depreciation rate lost relevance. In European emerging countries during the regional 
sovereign debt crisis, the negative role of the U.S. yield curve was restored. However, the 
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borrowing costs of European sovereigns decoupled from the U.S. stock market, while still being 
affected by international markets volatility. The evidence on volatility especially is in line with 
Afonso et al. (2014). With respect to differences across regions, I report evidence of two 
clusters, one represented by Europe and Central Asia, and the other including Latin America 
and the Caribbean and East Asia and Pacific. The spreads in the former are more persistent over 
time. Furthermore, they are affected by the U.S. yield curve, as well as by the U.S. stock market 
returns. On the other hand, the spreads in the latter are less persistent but bear a larger time-
invariant premium. Moreover, they do not depend on the U.S. interest rates, but they are more 
affected than the former by the U.S. equity market. 
In the second model, I document that country-specific fundamentals in general are the 
most relevant leading indicators of sovereign defaults (as argued by Remolona et al., 2008). 
Notably, the sustainability of public finances and the financial development of the domestic 
banking sector are important factors. Particularly, the health of the banking sector is crucial, as 
banking fragilities impinge on government debt sustainability (Acharya et al., 2014). However, 
financial figures are not the only relevant indicators, as extra-financial performances (in terms 
of ESG indicators) also contribute to signal the occurrence of a default (Margaretic & Pouget, 
2018). Current domestic defaults tend to anticipate upcoming external defaults, while a history 
of past defaults makes sovereign debt distress more likely to recur (but its effect is negligible 
when the last default is distant in time, as in Jeanneret and Souissi, 2016). The depreciation rate 
of the local currency is the only relevant predictor among the external variables. International 
risk factors do not seem to affect systematically the probability of default. Nonetheless, the 
global financial crisis shifted upwards the probability of default of all the countries in the 
sample. Finally, it is worth noting that the robustness of the estimates is corroborated to a certain 
extent by the accuracy of the classification method, which correctly predicts most of the out-
of-sample observations. 
An interesting remark pertains to the limited relevance of external factors as drivers of 
default risk. Specifically, differently from the predictions of the original sin hypothesis 
proposed by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), neither currency mismatches nor maturity 
mismatches in the composition of sovereign debt seem to affect default risk. The irrelevance of 
currency mismatches is in line with Jeanneret and Souissi (2016); however, in their study 
maturity mismatches are a significant predictor of default. The depreciation rate of the local 
currency is relevant, but the mere occurrence of an extreme currency shock does not seem to 
push the probability of default up. Furthermore, inflation – which reflects internally the stability 
of the currency – does not appear to be a significant predictor of default as well (consistent with 
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Jeanneret and Souissi, 2016). When compared to the robust role of the depreciation rate and 
inflation in the model related to sovereign risk premia, it highlights that international investors 
still price these factors into spreads, despite their limited effects on the actual default risk. I 
interpret this evidence as a heritage from the decades prior to the early 2000s, when hiking 
inflation rates and external fragilities severely undermined the creditworthiness of sovereign 
issuers of emerging market economies. 
This thesis builds on the existing empirical literature on sovereign default risk and its 
pricing by the means of a comprehensive approach, which takes care of several potential issues 
related to the data and the methodology adopted to address the research question. However, I 
acknowledge that there is room for improvement. Regarding the data, the whole analysis would 
benefit from the use of information released at a higher frequency, e.g. daily or weekly data for 
sovereign spreads on the one side, and monthly or quarterly data on sovereign defaults on the 
other. It would be also interesting to analyse more in detail the impact of some specific factors, 
e.g. ESG performances, or the interaction of banking and currency crises with sovereign 
defaults; but clearly, both these extensions of the model are conditional on larger data 
availability (especially if analysing emerging market economies). For what concerns the 
methodology, and specifically the model on sovereign spreads, one possible amendment would 
be to allow for heterogeneous slopes by the adoption of a pooled mean group estimator or a 
mean group estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999), which relax the assumption of homogenous 
coefficients of the dynamic fixed effects panel regression. Another extension of interest would 
consist in disentangling the direction of causality between spreads and credit ratings, for 
instance by the use of a VAR framework. With respect to the model on sovereign defaults, the 
performances of the classifier may improve by moving from conventional econometric 
techniques to more sophisticated machine learning algorithms, e.g. random forest or neural 
network (Holopainen & Sarlin, 2017). However, compared to the binary logistic regression, 
these classification methods usually require a full parametrisation by the researcher, which 
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Table 1.1: Summary table of the literature review on the global determinants of sovereign spreads. 
Authors 
(date) 
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1996.12 
Irrelevant1 Estimating the 
determinants of the 
issuance of sovereign 




Both demand and supply factors 
are important. Short-run 
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2003.06  
Daily Measuring the common 
factors behind sovereign 
spread movements in the 




Changes in a single common 
factor drive one third of the 
variation. This factor is 
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2006.08 
Daily Disentangling the 
parameters of the risk-
neutral default and 
recovery processes from 
the term structure of 







Changes in a single common 
factor capture almost all the 
variation (96%) in the term 







Monthly Disentangling the default 
risk component and the 
risk premium component 
of the sovereign CDS 








Changes in a single common 
factor account for most of the 
variation (64%) in the spreads. 
Global variables (U.S. equity, 
volatility and bond spreads) 
determine both the default risk 
and the risk premium component 
Fender et al. 
(2012) 
80 EC 2002.04 
2011.12 
Daily Estimating the 
determinants of 
sovereign CDS spreads 
before and after the 





Spreads are driven by global and 
regional risk premia (namely 
U.S. bond, equity and high-yield 
returns) rather than by country-
specific fundamentals, especially 
in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis 






Monthly Estimating the effect of 
economic fundamentals 









Before the global financial crisis 
a single common factor drives 
half of the variation in the 
spreads; after the crisis its 
influence is even more dominant 
than before. Its effect does not 
depend on country fundamentals 
Note. 1 The variables are measured at the time of issuance. 
 
Table 1.2: Summary table of the literature review on the country-specific determinants of sovereign spreads. 
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(date) 
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Quarterly Estimating the effect of 
country fundamentals on 
sovereign CDS spreads 




External fundamentals are more 
important drivers of spreads 
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Table 1.3: Summary table of the literature review on the spillovers and contagion between sovereign spreads. 
Authors 
(date) 









Monthly Examining the 
determinants of 










Sovereign bond spreads in the 
EMU tend to converge before the 
sovereign debt crisis. After the 
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Monthly Estimate the drivers of 
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The authors find evidence of 
fundamentals contagion on 
sovereign risk. Regional 
contagion, instead, decreases after 
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clustered in time and 
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Daily Identifying regional 
contagion effects and 






The authors document evidence of 
immediate regional contagion on 
sovereign credit risk, while global 





Sample Period Frequency Research question Methodology Results 
fundamentals and 
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financial crisis and the 




The degree of cointegration 
among EMU countries decreases 
after the U.S. financial crisis; the 
divergence process is due to 
differentials in the expectations of 
fiscal distress. The transmission 
mechanism remains unaltered 
before and after the European 
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Table 1.4: Summary table of the literature review on the causes of sovereign defaults. 
Authors 
(date) 





3 EC and 
AC 
Irrelevant1 Irrelevant1 Understanding the 
causes of financial 
fragility and providing 




The authors underline the 
materiality of the original 
sin hypothesis (i.e. a 
situation in which the local 
currency cannot be used to 
borrow abroad, nor long 





70 EC and 
AC 
1800 2014 Yearly Assessing the 
interrelationships 
between sovereign 
defaults and other types 
of crises (currency 




External debt surges 
(caused by currency crises) 
tend to originate banking 
crises, which in turn tend to 
trigger sovereign debt crises 










Daily Assessing the 
interlinkages between 
bank bailouts and 




Bank bailouts increase 
sovereign credit risk, which 
in turn raises bank credit 
risk as banks hold 
government bonds and 




46 EC and 
AC 
1980 2005 Yearly Estimating the effect of 
stronger private financial 






Sovereign defaults are 
costlier and, thus, less likely 
in those countries wherein 
the financial sector is more 
developed, banks holds 
more government bonds 





100 EC and 
AC 
1996 2012 Yearly Estimating the 
determinants of 




Currency mismatches in the 
sovereign debt composition 
do not affect the probability 
of default, whereas maturity 
mismatches do affect it 
Ottonello and 
Perez (2019) 
18 EC 2004 2014 Yearly Study the determinants 






The disappearance of the 
original sin hypothesis over 
time is due to the gradual 
stabilisation of growth and 
inflation 





Table 1.5: Summary table of the literature review on the early-warnings of sovereign defaults. 
Authors 
(date) 
Sample Period Frequency Research question Methodology Results 
Manasse et 
al. (2003) 
47 EC 1970 
2002 
Annual Identifying patterns in 
the data leading to a 





The most efficient leading 
indicators of default are solvency 
measures, liquidity measures, 
internal and external 
macroeconomic imbalances and 




31 EC 1975 
2002 
Annual Assessing the 







Solvency measures, liquidity 
measures and other internal and 
external macroeconomic variables 
are significant predictors of default. 
Liquidity is even more important 
when defining debt distress as 
turbulence in the sovereign bond 





32 EC 1994 
2007 
Annual Estimating the effect 




sovereign credit risk 
Reduced form 
logit model 
The volatility of terms-of-trade 
(along with measures of solvency, 
liquidity and creditworthiness) is a 









Annual Checking the 
robustness of some of 
the most common 
predictors of default in 





The effect of some factors on the 
probability of default is robust to 
differences in the conditioning set, 
while the effect of other factors 
varies considerably depending on 









Annual Estimating the 
determinants of 




Sovereign defaults on foreign 












for the early-warning 









The binary logit model accounting 
for regional heterogeneity of the 
signalling indicator has the best 
performances as an early-warning 
model in terms of predictive power. 
It is also important to allow for 
spillovers from the banking sector 









Quarterly Comparing the 
performances of 
different classification 
methods for the early-
warning prediction of 







Machine learning algorithms tend 
to outperform traditional early-
warning models based on statistical 





Table 2.1: Conversion table of the rating scales from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch into the numeric rating scale used 
in the first model. 
  Moody’s S&P Fitch Numeric scale 
Investment grade Highest quality Aaa AAA AAA 20 
High quality Aa1 AA+ AA+ 19 
Aa2 AA AA 18 
Aa3 AA- AA- 17 
Strong payment capacity A1 A+ A+ 16 
A2 A A 15 
A3 A- A- 14 
Adequate payment capacity Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 13 
Baa2 BBB BBB 12 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 11 
Speculative grade Likely to fulfil obligations, ongoing uncertainty Ba1 BB+ BB+ 10 
Ba2 BB BB 9 
Ba3 BB- BB- 8 
High credit risk B1 B+ B+ 7 
B2 B B 6 
B3 B- B- 5 
Very high credit risk Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 4 
Caa2 CCC CCC 3 
Caa3 CCC- CCC- 2 
Near default with possibility of recovery Ca CC CC 1 
  C  
Default C SD DDD  
 D DD  
  D  
 










East Asia and 
Pacific 



























Note. The six world regions, as recognised by the IMF, are in column. The 19 countries in the dataset belong to 
the Bloomberg Barclays Emerging Markets Local Currency Liquid Government Index. I have 153 monthly 
observations for each country (144 non-missing observations on average, min. 122, max. 150). 
 





East Asia and 
Pacific 


















































43. Sri Lanka 
Note. The six world regions, as recognised by the IMF, are in column. Countries also included in the first dataset 




Table 3.6. External sovereign defaults by region, country and year. 
Panel A: Latin America and Caribbean. 
 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
Argentina      X X X X X         X 
Dominican 
Republic 
         X          
Ecuador             X X      
Honduras X X X X X X X X X X          
Nicaragua     X X X X X X X X X X X     
Panama X                   
Paraguay        X X           
Venezuela         X X          
 
Panel B: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
Angola     X X X X            
Central African 
Republic 
 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Côte d'Ivoire  X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Kenya   X  X               
Nigeria         X X          
Zimbabwe          X    X X X X X X 
 
Panel C: East-Asia and Pacific. 
 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
Indonesia     X  X             
Myanmar    X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Panel D: Middle East and North Africa. 
 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 
Algeria X                   
Note. Panels A, B, C and D report the list of external sovereign defaults for the four regions of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific and Middle East and North Africa, respectively. I report 
the year of the observation (1996-2014) in column, while the respective country is in row. An issuer is considered 
in default if not meeting its external obligations in the corresponding year, regardless of whether the default started 
in a previous year. Sovereign defaults on official external creditors are excluded. Please note that some default 






Figure 3.2: Average VIX index (in absolute points) and average sovereign CDS spread (in basis 
points) over time. 
 
Figure 3.3: Average U.S. effective federal funds rate (in basis points) and average sovereign CDS 
spread (in basis points) over time. 
 
Figure 3.4: S&P500 index monthly close (in absolute terms) and average sovereign CDS spread (in 








Figure 3.8: Fraction of countries in default contemporaneously experiencing a currency crisis and/or a 
banking crisis by year, in percentage. 
 
 
